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I. About the Commission
The International  Expert  Commission  for  Evaluation  of  the  May 6,  2012 events  on  Bolotnaya
Square in Moscow was established in response to an appeal from Russian journalists and human
rights defenders to leading international and Russian human rights organisations.  The appeal stated
that journalists and public observers present at Bolotnaya on May 6, 2012 witnessed a series of
detentions  and  arrests  of  participants,  some  of  whom  were  then  charged  with  participation,
organisation and incitement to mass riots or using violence against law enforcement personnel. The
appeal also stated that, in their view, evidence of police abuse was not properly taken into account
and police violence was never properly investigated.
The signatories of the appeal expressed concern that the results of investigation and resulting trials
would not be based on the principles of the rule of law, but rather driven by political motives. Thus,
they proposed the establishment of a commission of experts on freedom of assembly and policing
measures to develop an objective and unbiased evaluation of the events of May 6, 2012.
The  Commission  was  initiated  by  major  international  human  rights  NGOs:  Amnesty
International, Article19, the European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and Human Rights,
the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), the International Civil Initiative for OSCE
(ICI OSCE), Civic Solidarity, the International Protection Centre and Human Rights Watch.  These
organisations are not, however, the authors of this report and bear no responsibility for its contents.
Their views may differ from those of the experts expressed in this report.
The Commission brought together the following leading experts in sphere of freedom of assembly
and police measures: Adam Bodnar (Poland), Michael Hamilton (United Kingdom), Neil Jarman
(United Kingdom), Evgeny Zhovtis (Kazakhstan), Oleg Martynenko (Ukraine) and Serhey Ostaf
(Moldova).
The Commission's mandate included the following objectives:
1) to prepare a chronology of the events of May 6 2012;
2) to  assess  the  compatibility  of  the  relevant  Russian  legal  framework  (including  the
concept of mass riots) with international human rights standards;
3) to review the measures taken by the police and the authorities in preparation for, during
and  after  the  assembly  and  consider  whether  they  were  justified,  necessary  and
proportional;
4) to review any legal cases resulting from the events of May 6 (focusing in particular on
the so-called ”Bolotnaya case”);
5) to provide a full report of their findings; and
6) to develop recommendations to the relevant authorities for improving the situation.
The work of the Commission was based on the following materials:
• evidence  from  the  official  investigation,  reports  and  statements  made  by  the  relevant
authorities and any other official information available on the case;
• information  from  public  investigations  and  observations  gathered  by  human  rights
defenders, journalists and others; and
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• reports by observers and journalists, witness testimony and video materials.
The following Russian human rights and civil society organisations issued a statement of support1
welcoming the Commission's establishment and recognizing the importance of the May 6 events
and the  need to  bring  more  attention  to  them and to  the  resulting  administrative  and criminal
persecution of their participants:
• Citizens' Watch (Saint-Petersburg);
• Civic Assistance Committee (Moscow);
• Human Rights Institute (Moscow);
• Interregional Committee Against Torture (Nizhny Novgorod);
• Komi Human Rights Commission “Memorial” (Syktyvkar);
• Moscow Helsinki Group;
• Youth Human Rights Movement;
• Public Verdict Foundation (Moscow);
• Centre for Democracy Development and Human Rights (Moscow);
• Lawyers for Constitutional Freedoms and Rights (Moscow);
• Human Rights Centre “Memorial” (Moscow)
These  organisations  stated  that  they  believe  that  the  Commission's  work  would  became  an
important part  of the process of evaluating the current Russian legislation and law-enforcement
practices and their compliance with human rights standards for freedom of peaceful assembly and
their policing.
The Memorial Human Rights Centre issued its own statement highlighting the importance of and
need for an objective legal analysis of the Bolotnaya events.2  
1http://6maycommission.org/ru/article/podderzhka-rossiyskih-organizaciy
2http://6maycommission.org/ru/news/v-moskve-nachinaetsya-bolshoy-politicheskiy-process-zayavlenie-pravozashchitn  
ogo-centra
4
«May 6, 2012 events on Bolotnaya square.  Assessment by the International Expert Commission»
II. Introduction
This interim report focuses on the march and the rally on May 6, 2012 in Moscow, staring from the
preparations by organizers before the events and including the events of the day up until the final
dispersal of the rally that evening.  The aim is to provide an independent review and analysis of
those  events  and  the  legitimacy  of  the  police’s  actions,  including  the  use  of  force,  from  the
perspective of existing international human rights standards and best practices for the regulation of
assemblies.  The report is based on available documents, journalistic reports and expert materials.
As some cases related to these events are currently before the courts while others are still under
investigation, the conclusions of this report should be considered to be of an interim nature and a
basis for further discussion and update.
In order to provide an objective and complete picture of the events, the Commission developed a
series  of  questions  that  it  distributed  to  the  city  administration  of  Moscow,  the  Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation, police authorities in Moscow, the Ombudsman of the Russian
Federation and event organizers.  Unfortunately the Commission did not receive replies from the
city  administration,  police  authorities  or  Investigative  Committee.   As  a  result,  the  analysis
contained in this report is based on information from open sources, including materials presented by
the  event  organizers,  observers  and  non-governmental  organisations,  materials  from  public
investigations and information provided by defense attorneys engaged in the so-called “Bolotnaya
case.”  These materials include: eyewitnesses testimony, videos from the media and private actors,
documents and some open data about the Bolotnaya criminal case. The experts analysed more than
50 hours of video-records and 200 documents related to the Bolotnaya events.  In addition, they met
organizers,  participants  and observers  of  the  events  and attended several  court  hearings  of  the
Bolotnaya case.
The Commission regrets that neither city authorities nor law enforcement agencies responded to its
questions, which to a certain extent may make this analysis incomplete.  Nevertheless, the materials
presented for the Commission's analysis allow it to set out with a high degree of confidence the
circumstances and events on Bolotnaya square and evaluate how police actions corresponded with
existing international standards.
This report does not pretend to provide a complete picture of all the events of this day and is mainly
focused  at  the  attempts  of  participants  in  the  “March  of  Millions”  to  reach  the  rally  site  on
Bolotnaya Square and also on the interaction between the police and the demonstrators that resulted
in multiple instances of violence and use of force, detentions and, subsequently, criminal charges.
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III. Legal Regulation of Freedom of Peaceful Assemblies
This report does not attempt to review current Russian legislation governing freedom of peaceful
assembly in the abstract. Nonetheless, in the context of the events on Bolotnaya Square on May 6,
2012 and the subsequent action of state authorities against those detained, it is important to review
key aspects of the legal framework for freedom of peaceful assembly in the Russian Federation.
Russia is  a state-party to the European Convention on Human Rights.  Art.  11 Section 1 of the
ECHR provides guarantees regarding freedom of assembly. 
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with
others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall  not prevent the imposition of
lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of
the administration of the State.”
Russia is also party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Art. 21 ICCPR
provides that:
“The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise
of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public),
the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
In interpreting these provisions, one should take into account the existing case-law of the European
Court of Human Rights and of the UN Human Rights Committee. Since Russia is also an OSCE
participating state, this report relies upon the OSCE ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines on
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (Second Edition).3 These guidelines draw – among other sources –
from international legal standards, including jurisprudence deriving from the European Convention
on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Article 31 of the Constitution of Russian Federation enshrines the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly:
“Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to assemble peacefully, without weapons,
hold rallies, meetings and demonstrations, marches and pickets.”
Art.  51,  Section 3 of  the  Russian  Federation  Constitution provides  for  conditions  under  which
freedom of assembly may be restricted. It is a typical limitation clause, which could be found in
other democratic constitutions:
“The human rights and the rights and freedoms of citizens may be limited by federal law only to the
3 OSCE ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Assembly, Second Edition, Warsaw – Strasbourg 2010, available at 
http://www.osce.org/baku/105947?download=true.
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extent  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  constitutional  system,
morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of other people, or for ensuring the defence of the
country and the security of the State.“
Organisation of peaceful assemblies is regulated in Russia by federal legislation, in particular the
Federal  Law  on  Assemblies,  Meetings,  Demonstrations,  Marches  and  Picketing  (no.  54-FZ of
August 18, 2004 – “the Assemblies Act”). 
This Law has been amended several times:
• by Federal Law no. 344-FZ of December 8, 2010, adopted by the State Duma on November
26, 2010, and ratified by the Federation Council on December 1, 2010;
• by Federal Law 4-FZ of February 7, 2011 (minor changes);
• by Federal Law 424-FZ of December 8, 2011 (minor changes); and
• by Federal Law No. 65-FZ of June 8, 2012.
Because the events on Bolotnaya Square took place on May 6, 2012 they need to be assessed on the
basis of the Federal Law of August 18, 2004, as amended by the law of December 8, 2010 (Law No.
344-FZ).  However,  it  should  also  be  noted  that  following the  events  on Bolotnaya  Square  the
Assemblies Act was significantly changed in order to restrict the organisation of assemblies. Those
changes are described in a separate part of this analysis.
It should be also noted that assemblies are regulated at the regional level. In particular, the Moscow
Law of 4 April 2007, No. 10 “Concerning the Ensuring of Enforcement of Russian Citizens’ Right
to Hold Rallies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches and Picketing in Moscow” is applicable.
 
An important legal act with implications for the exercise of the right to assembly is the Code of
Administrative  Offences  of  December  30,  2001,  which  provides  for  fines  for  breaching  legal
obligations pursuant to the organisation of or participation in assemblies.
 
A  number  of  international  organisations  and  institutions  reviewed  and  commented  on  the
Assemblies Act.    In March, 2012 the Venice Commission issue an Opinion4 in which it  made
numerous recommendations regarding amendments to the Assemblies Act. However, none of the
recommendations were adopted. To the contrary, in June 2012, the State Duma adopted further
changes to the Assemblies Act further restricting freedom of assembly.5 The Venice Commission
then  issued  two  more  Opinions,  on  August  7,  2012  and  March  11,  2013.  As  they  refer  to
amendments passed after May 6, 2012, however, they cannot be taken fully into account when
assessing the Bolotnaya square events. 
The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg issued several judgments relating to freedom of
assembly  in  Russia.  In  particular,  in  the  ECtHR  analyzed  application  of  Article  11  of  the
Convention in the cases of Berladir and others v. Russia,6 Barankevich v. Russia,7 Makhmudov v.
4 Opinion No. 659/2011, CDL-AD(2012)007
5 For example, increase of responsibility of organizers for disorder caused by participants, increase in administrative
offences  penalties,  prohibition  of  wearing  masks  during  an  assembly  and  the  designation  of  common  sites  for
organisation of assemblies. 
6 Berladir and Others v. Russia, no. 34202/06, 10 July 2012
7 Barankevich v. Russia, no. 10519/03, 26 July 2007
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Russia,8 Alekseyev v. Russia,9 Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia10 and Kasparov and others v. Russia.11 The
Assemblies  Act  and its  application  were  also  subject  to  assessment  by  the  UN Human Rights
Committee in the case of Olga Chebotareva v. Russia.12
The follow is a list of key areas in which the  Assembly Law that was in force on May 6, 2012
contradicts existing international human rights standards.
3.1. The System of Organising Public Events 
The procedure for organising assemblies is set out in Article 7 of the Assemblies Act. It is based on
the system of notice-and-endorsement, which means that organizers must notify the authorities of
plans for an assembly and the authorities should adjust their activities to this notification.
Under Article 7 of the Assemblies Act, notice to hold a public event should be sent not more than 15
days and no more than 10 days prior to the holding of a public event. In case of a picket, notice
should be submitted no later than three days prior to the event (except when those days fall on a
Sunday or a non-working holiday – then notification must be made four days in advance). 
Under Article 12, Section 2, points 1 and 2 of the Assemblies Act, the authorities should inform the
organizers within three days from receipt of the notice (or in the case of a picket when notification
was submitted less than five days prior to the event, on the same date) of:
1) “a reasoned proposal to alter the venue and/or time of the public event,” and/or
2) “any proposal for the organizer of the event to bring the aims, form or other conditions for
holding  the  event  as  indicated  in  the  notice  into  the  line  with  the  requirement  of  the
Assemblies Act.”
This provision in fact opens up a negotiating process between the organizers and the authorities. As
a result of a judgement of the Russian Constitutional Court, there is no procedure in the Assemblies
Act for banning the assembly, even if there are reasons to do so.13 In general, the Assemblies Act
promotes freedom of assembly as a constitutional value, but introduces specific limitations to its
exercise by inserting a negotiating procedure in Article 12 Section 2.  According to the Venice
Commission and the Commissioner for Human Rights, this is in fact an authorization procedure and
makes the exercise of freedom of assembly subject to governmental approval. Lack of consent by
the organizer to proposals made by the authorities may result in the de facto prohibition of holding
any public event whatsoever. Therefore, the procedure stipulated in Article 12 Section 2 is in fact a
“take it or leave it” procedure. Either the organizers agree to a proposal made by the authorities or
they cannot hold an assembly. Such an interpretation stems directly from Article 5, Section 5 of the
Assemblies Act, which states that “The organizer of a public event shall have no right to hold it
8 Makhmudov v. Russia, no. 35082/04, 26 July 2007
9 Alekseyev v. Russia, nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, 21 October 2010
10 Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia, no. 10877/04, 23 October 2008
11 Kasparov and others v. Russia, no. 21613/07, 3 October 2013
12 Olga Chebotareva v. Russia, UN Human Rights Committee, communication No. 1866/2009, views of 26 March 2012.
13 It should be noted that by virtue of Article 12 Section 2 of the Assemblies Act, in case when notice of the assembly
may give rise to a suggestion that its actual goals may be contrary to provisions of the Russian Federation Constitution
or may violate criminal law, the authorities may give immediately to the organizer „a motivated caution in writing” that
may later result in criminal responsibility of the organizers. 
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when […] no agreement has been reached with the executive authority of the subject of the Russian
Federation or local self-government body on changes they propose to the place and/or time of the
public event.”
 
The Assemblies Act provides the authorities with broad discretion in indicating the place and/or
time for holding an assembly. Although organizers may appeal the authorities’ decision to the courts
(cf Article 19 of the Assemblies Act), in fact this right is illusory, as there is almost no chance to
obtain a verdict before the planned date of an assembly (see comments below).
 
Therefore,  the  general  operation  of  the  system  is  different  from  that  of  a  typical
notice-and-endorsement  system,  since  it  provides  the  authorities  with the possibility  to  suggest
modifications to the location and time of the assembly,  in effect giving them the authorization
power. In numerous cases, most notably in Alexeyev v. Russia,14 it has been proven that this system
is deficient and results in violations of freedom of assembly. Therefore, the Venice Commission in
its opinion of March 2012 suggested changing the system.
In the case of  Chernogova v. Russia,15 the organizers of the assembly were twice prevented from
holding a demonstration in specific locations in the city centre. As an alternative, the authorities
proposed  they  hold  pickets  in  locations  far  from  the  centre  of  Nizhny  Novogrod.  They  also
presented  arguments  about  alleged  disturbances  connected  with  the  organisation  of  the  events,
which  proved  to  be  unsubstantiated.  Accordingly,  the  UN  Human  Rights  Committee  found  a
violation  of  Article  21 of  the ICCPR, concluding that  the  reasons given by the  authorities  for
rejecting the requests for pickets were merely a pretext for interference with freedom of assembly.
The issue of the location of a demonstration was the subject of consideration in the case of Berladir
and others v. Russia. In this case, the authorities did not agree with the proposed location of an
assembly in front of the Moscow Mayor’s office. Instead, they proposed another location, but one
that  was  not  sufficiently  relevant  to  ideas  to  be  expressed  during  the  assembly.  Because  the
organizers did not reply to the proposal of alternative venue the authorities declared the picket
illegal and decided to disperse it.  In this case, the ECtHR found that there was no violation of
Article 11. However, Judges Vajić and Kovler issued a dissenting opinion in which they stated that
there was a violation of Article 11. They suggested that the Russian legislation could be regarded as
a means of  restricting assemblies  and that  in  this  case the overly-broad application of the law
resulted in the violation of the right to organize a peaceful assembly. 
3.2. The System of Review of Cases before the Date of an Assembly
Under Russian law it is almost impossible to obtain a final decision of a court reviewing the legality
of  decisions  made  by  the  authorities  to  ban  or  propose  an  alternative  venue  with  which  the
organizers do not agree before the planned date of the assembly. Even if organizers could obtain a
judgment in the court of first instance before the planned date of an assembly, it only enters after ten
days, long after the date for any assembly.
The international human rights standard is to obtain a final ruling (judgment) before the planned
date of an assembly.16 The authorities should introduce reasonable time-limits within which they
14 Alekseyev v. Russia, nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, § 99, 21 October 2010
15 Olga Chebotareva v. Russia, UN Human Rights Committee, communication No. 1866/2009, views of 26 March 2012.
16 Baczkowski and Others v. Poland̨ , no. 1543/06, § 81, 3 May 2007; Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, no. 9106/06, 12 June
2012. See also para. 139 of the OSCE Guidelines on Freedom of Assembly.
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should produce a final decision.17 Any possibility of reaching a post-hoc remedy in the domestic
legal system is insufficient to meet this standard.18
The problem of a lack of judicial review was underlined in the case of Alekseyev v. Russia, which
concerned bans on gay pride marches. It was also underlined in the dissenting opinion in Berladir
and others v. Russia.19
Lack of judicial review has important consequences for the exercise of freedom of assembly. If
review has only a post-hoc character, the authorities may act almost in an uncontrolled fashion and
adopt decisions contrary to the interests of minorities, marginalized groups or political dissidents. It
creates a space for arbitrary decisions, taken without proper grounds or justification. Organizers of
such assemblies lack effective possibilities to appeal against such decisions and to challenge their
material  grounds.  Lack  of  judicial  review  also  has  a  negative  impact  on  the  verification  of
administrative penalties adjudicated by courts as a result of participation in illegal demonstrations
(see comments below). 
3.3. The Obligation to “Ensure Public Order”
According to Article 7, Section 3, point 6 of the Assemblies Act, in their notice to the authorities the
organizers  of  an  assembly  must  indicate  inter  alia “the  forms and methods  to  be  used by the
organizer of the public event to ensure public order.” This provision gives the authorities too much
discretion to decide whether in fact the forms and methods to be used by the organizers will in fact
ensure “public order.” If the authorities decide that “public order” will not be sufficiently secured
they may submit “reasoned proposal” to change the venue and/or time of the public event, but they
may also make other proposals to bring “the aims, forms or other conditions” for holding the event
into line with Federal Law.
 
As previously mentioned, such overbroad formulations give the authorities the ability to enter into
negotiations regarding changes to the assembly’s venue and the methods of its organisation.  There
is a general interpretation that the protection of public order does not allow for the organisation of
simultaneous demonstrations and counter-demonstrations. The authorities use the notification of a
second demonstration in a similar place and time as a previously notified demonstration as grounds
to  suggest  changing  the  location  of  the  first  demonstration,  without  any  attempt  to  make
adjustments so that two or more assemblies can be held in the same place separated from each other.
Such an approach runs counter the human rights standard that requires that it be possible to hold
two or more assemblies in the same place within “sight and sound” distance.20
The authorities often use the scheduling of cultural events or festivities on the same site to propose
to change the venue of a demonstration, which approach runs counter to human rights standards.
 
Court decisions indicate that the authorities have used several other arguments to restrict assemblies
17 Baczkowski and Others v. Poland̨ , no. 1543/06, § 83, 3 May 2007
18 Alekseyev v. Russia, nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09, § 99, 21 October 2010
19 See also the dissenting opinion of judges Vajić and Kovler in  Berladir and others v. Russia.  „It appears that no
effective remedies were available at the time so as to provide prompt redress in the applicant’s situation [...] It is not
evident that a remedy was sufficiently established and available in practice in November 2005. In particular, it does not
appear that there were any specific procedures or time limits for such cases.”
20 Para. 101 OSCE Guidelines on Freedom of Assembly.
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later found to be unjustified (e.g. in Alekseyev v. Russia). For example, in Barankevich v. Russia, the
ECtHR found that the mere existence of a risk is insufficient to ban an event. In making their risk
assessment the authorities must produce concrete estimates of the potential scale of disturbances in
order  to  evaluate  the resources  necessary to neutralize that  threat.  Resort  to  the banning of an
assembly in such a situation is the most radical measure.21
In Makhmudov v. Russia, a demonstration directed against the Moscow government’s policies was
banned on the basis of the argument that there was a potential “terrorist threat.” At the same time,
however, public festivities organized by the Moscow government were allowed to proceed without
incident notwithstanding the alleged “terrorist threat.” Therefore, the European Court of Human
Rights found a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.
In  Kasparov and others v. Russia,22 the ECtHR assessed the arrest and subsequent administrative
detention of protesters going to the demonstration when it was disputable if the demonstrations was
authorized  or  not.  According  to  the  ECtHR,  regardless  of  the  dispute,  the  arrests  constituted
interference  in  freedom of  assembly.  The Court  found that  the  sole  reason  for  the  arrests  and
administrative detentions was the authorities’ perception that the demonstration was unauthorised.
There was no “pressing social need” for the arrests and therefore the Court found a violation of
Article 11 of the Convention.
3.4.  The  Obligation  of  Organizers  to  Suspend  a  Demonstration  in  Case  of
Violations of Public Order
According to Article 5, Section 4, points 5 and 6 of the Assemblies Act, the organizers of a public
event are obliged, within their competence, to ensure public order and the security of citizens during
an assembly. They are also obliged to suspend or terminate a public event if participants undertake
any illegal actions. At the same time, it is the duty of the authorities to cooperate with the organizers
to secure public order (Article 12, Section 1, point 5).
Articles 15-17 of the Assemblies Act provide for a procedure to suspend or terminate assemblies
and for interaction between the organizer and administrative authorities in this regard.  In general, a
public event  may be ordered suspended if  “there occurs,  during the holding of a public  event,
through the fault of its participants a violation of law and order not entailing the threat to the life
and  health  of  its  participants.”  In  such  cases,  the  authorities  may  demand  that  the  organizers
suspend the assembly in order to remedy or stop the violation. If the organizer fail to uspend the
event, then it is within the authorities’ remit to do so themselves.  When the violation has been
remedied, then the assembly may continue. If it cannot be remedied or stopped, then the assembly
can be terminated.
The procedure for terminating a public event is provided in Article 17 of the Assemblies Act. In
general, the grounds for termination of a public event include:
1) the existence of a real threat to the life and health of citizens and also to the property of
individuals or legal entities, and 
2) the perpetration by participants of illegal acts or the deliberate violation by the organizers of
the provisions of the Assemblies Act concerning the procedure for holding a public event.
21 Barankevich v. Russia, para. 33. 
22 Kasparov and others v. Russia, no. 21613/07, 3 October 2013 
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In such a situation it is a duty of the authorities to give instructions to the organizer, fix the time for
compliance and, in case the organizers fail to terminate the event, to directly address participants
and fix a time limit for compliance with their instructions. In case of non-compliance, the police
may intervene and take “appropriate measures to terminate the public event.”
 
The  procedure  for  terminating  or  suspending  public  events  may  be  criticized  for  use  of
overly-general provisions. However, as such it is quite similar to other legislative acts and cannot be
challenged from the point of view of non-compliance with international human rights standards.
Certainly, violations may happen in the context of these procedures. For example, a provocation
may provide a  good opportunity for the authorities to  invoke the procedure for  suspension (or
termination) of an assembly. It is, however, not so much a legislative problem as a problem of how
assemblies are administered and whether decisions and assessments made by the authorities are
proportional.
However, Article 17, Section 3 of the Assemblies Act may be regarded as contrary to human rights
standards. According to this provision, the procedure for terminating public events shall not apply in
case of “the outbreak of mass disturbances, pogroms, arson or in other cases calling for emergency
action.”  In  such  cases  the  authorities  are  not  restricted  by  the  procedures  for  terminating  an
assembly but may do so “in line with the legislation of the Russian Federation.” In practice, t means
that police may start actions and to disperse demonstration immediately after existence of any such
“emergency” situations. 
It should be noted that reference to “mass disturbances” or to “other cases calling for emergency
actions” is a broad formula. At the same time, its interpretation depends solely on authorities, and
not  on  an  organizer.  Certainly,  this  provision  should  be  interpreted  in  the  context  of  previous
application of procedure for suspension or termination of an assembly. However, in practice it is
quite easy for the police to claim that an “emergency” requires more active involvement and that
following the normal procedure for suspending or terminating an assembly is not sufficient to stop
violations. 
3.5. Administrative Responsibility
Administrative responsibility in the context of the organisation of public assemblies is set out in
Article 20, Section 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The following offences are regulated
by this provision:
1) violation of procedures for organisation of a rally, meeting, demonstration, march or picket;
2) violation of procedures for conducting a rally, meeting, demonstration, march or picket; and 
3) arranging or holding an unauthorized rally, meeting, demonstration, march or picket in the
direct vicinity of a nuclear plant or facility for the storage of nuclear material or radioactive
substances. 
The Assemblies Act provided for fines of 1,000 – 2,000 roubles for violations of the procedures for
organizing or conducting a rally. Only in case of an offence committed in the vicinity of a nuclear
site did the Act foresee punishment in the form of administrative detention up to 15 days. These
provisions did not, as such, create any specific burden on the freedom of assembly. However, the
Code of Administrative Offences stipulates another offence, which was regularly applied in this
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context, i.e. failure to follow a lawful order or demand of a law enforcement officer (Article 19,
para. 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences). In case of refusal to disperse or to follow other
orders by law enforcement officers, organizers and participants in an assembly could face penalties
of up to 15 days of administrative detention. Furthermore, under Article 27, para. 1 of the Code of
Administrative Offences, persons participating in public events may be detained fir up to 48 hours if
this is necessary to prevent an administrative offence, determine the person’s identification, compile
a crime report or to ensure that other procedures related to the imposition of administrative penalties
are properly followed. This provision was the subject of an analysis by the Russian Constitutional
Court, which found it to be compliant with the Constitution.
 
In general, one cannot argue that a provision imposing legal responsibility for failure to obey the
law is contrary to human rights’ standards. However, any forms of detention should be used only as
an exception. Regular use of administrative detention creates a chilling effect on the freedom of
assembly. A mere protest against decisions by the police regarding issues such as the suspension or
termination of an event may result in application of this provision. Therefore, use of this provision
was subject of critical comments by various international institutions and also by the Commissioner
for Human Rights.23
It  should be underlined that lack of a proper system of judicial review of decisions concerning
assemblies has a negative impact on fair trial guarantees in case of administrative offences. When
domestic courts assess whether there was a violation of the Code of Administrative Offences, they
do not consider if participants in the demonstration knowingly violated the law or if the authorities’
decision to block the assembly (or to change the venue) was justified and compliant with standards.
When  administrative  penalties  are  issued  there  is  usually  no  decision  on  the  legality  of  the
assembly,  which  is  normally  made only  much later.  Therefore,  in  the  absence  of  a  final  court
judgement  on  the  legality  of  an  administrative  decision  the  courts  dealing  with  administrative
offences adjudicate cases on the basis of the assumption that the administrative decision was legal.24
3.6. “Peaceful Assembly”
Article  21 of the ICCPR (and Article 11 ECHR) recognizes only a  right  to  peaceful assembly.
Where an assembly is peaceful, the authorities have a positive obligation to protect and facilitate it
– even if it  is technically unlawful (Platform  ‘Arzte fuer das Leben’ vs Austria 1988;  Bukta vs
Hungary 2007). 
“Peaceful” has been held to exclude assemblies where the organizers and participants “have violent
intentions” (G v Federal Republic of Germany 1989). However, in Christians Against Racism and
Fascism v UK 1980, the report of the European Commission on Human Rights stated that: 
“…the right to freedom of peaceful  assembly is  secured to  everyone who has the intention of
organising a peaceful demonstration ... The possibility … of extremists with violent intentions,
not members of the organising association joining the demonstration cannot as such take away
that  right.   Even  if  there  is  a  real  risk  of  a  public  procession  resulting  in  disorder  by
23 See the letter by Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights on ensuring the right
to freedom of assembly in the Russian Federation of 21 July 2011; see also the response by the Russian Federation of
20 September 2011.
24 Dissenting opinion of judges Vajić and Kovler in Berladir and others v. Russia.
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developments outside the control of those organising it, such procession does not for this reason
alone fall outside of the scope of Article 11.”
Similarly, it was noted by the European Court of Human Rights in  Ziliberberg v Moldova (2004)
that “an individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a result of sporadic
violence or other punishable acts committed by others in the course of the demonstration, if the
individual in question remains peaceful in his or her own intentions or behaviour.”25 Thus, “[i]t is
not necessary to restrict those freedoms in any way unless the person in question has committed a
reprehensible act when exercising his rights” (Ezelin v France, 1991). These rulings have particular
significance for the interpretation of Article 212 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation:
participation in, or organisation of, a mass riot.
In this regard, we are particularly concerned that the participants of the May 6, 2012 rally have been
charged with organisation of, participation in or inciting “mass riots,” and also by the fact that it is
still  unclear  what  precisely  the  courts  regard  as  mass  riots,  what  factors  the  courts  take  into
consideration when deciding whether an individual participated in or organized such a riot,  and
what considerations influence their sentences.
25 See also Gasparyan v. Armenia (No.1) (2009), para.43; Galstyan v. Armenia (2008), para.115; Ashughyan v. Armenia 
(2008), para.90; and Cetinkaya v. Turkey (2006, in French only).
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IV. Defining “Mass Riots”
This  section  of  the  Report  will  analyse  certain  norms  of  the  Criminal  Code  of  the  Russian
Federation and will respond to the following questions:
 
a) how to interpret these norms; 
b) requirements that evidence must meet in order to merit a conviction.
The “Conclusions” section of this report discusses whether the existing evidence is sufficient to
qualify the May 6, 2012 events as “mass riots.” 
The term “mass riots” is often used interchangeably with the term “mass disorders;”26 however,
“mass riots” is altogether distinct from other elements referred to in Article 212. 27  In order to
determine the applicability of Article 212, “mass riots” must therefore be defined separately.  
Article 212 offences are among the most serious public order offences under the Criminal Code.
Their grave nature is underscored by the fact that the code provides for sentences of up to 10 years
for organising “mass riots,” or 8 years for participation in the same. Article 212 can be contrasted,
for example, with “hooliganism” (under Article 213 of the Code)28 or “vandalism” (under Article
214).29 
The term “mass” in Article 212 appears to emphasize that an offence’s severity depends on the
sheer number of people involved. Offences relating to “mass riots” derive their gravity from the fact
that the persons involved act together in substantial numbers and use this “weight of numbers” to
achieve their purpose. 30 The threshold for engaging Article 212 must therefore involve violent
conduct on the part of a substantial number of individuals acting together.
The term “mass” might also be interpreted as describing a multitude of disorderly incidents (rather
than merely the substantial number of people involved). The use of the plural term “riots” suggests
such a reading. However, the phrase “mass riots” is not synonymous with public events at which
some disorder, violence or riotous behaviour occurs. As the European Court of Human Rights has
emphasized, “an individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a result of
sporadic violence or other punishable acts committed by others in the course of the demonstration,
if the individual in question remains peaceful in his or her own intentions or behaviour.”31 In the
absence of sustained and continuous violent conduct involving the same individuals, incidents
that occur over the course of several hours should not be considered “mass riots” under Article 212
26 It is noteworthy that an alternative translation of Article 212 – that which is relied upon in the application to the
European  Court  of  Human Rights  by several  of  those  who remain  in  pre-trial  detention (Akimenkov and 6 other
applicants v Russia, Application no. 2613/13) – frames the offences therein as organising, participating in or inciting
“mass disorders.” Under this translation, the occurrence of a “riot” is but one of the “accompanying” elements that must
also be present if Article 212 is to be engaged. Similarly, the investigation commission on the causes and consequences
of the events that took place in Chisinau in 2009 used the term 'mass disorder’ rather than “mass riot.”
27 Namely, “violence, pogroms, arson, property destruction, the use of firearms, explosives or explosive devices, and
armed resistance to a public official.”
28 “Hooliganism” carries a maximum custodial sentence of up to two years, or up to five years if committed by a group
of persons, or up to eight years in cases where weapons are used.
29 The maximum sentence for “vandalism” is arrest for a term of up to three months.
30 For  example,  Thornton  et  al,  The Law of  Public  Order  and Protest  (OUP:  2010)  at  1.09,  citing  the  UK Law
Commission Report, Offences Relating to Public Order, Law Com. 123, 24 October 1983, Cmnd. 9510).
31 Ziliberberg v. Moldova (2004, admissibility).
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but should instead be treated as separate incidents. 
In addition to the number of people involved and the sustained nature of the conduct, one must also
consider the degree of violence necessary to meet the threshold of “mass riots.” Article 212 exists at
the top end of the spectrum of “seriousness.” As such, there is a need to differentiate between acts
that fall under the scope of Article 212 and those which are covered by Article 318 (use of violence
against a public official).32 Evidence – where it exists – of individual participation in an Article 318
offence should not, by extension, also be used again under Article 212. If there is credible evidence
of violent acts that do not pose a threat to the lives of public officials (under Article 318), this
evidence in and of itself does not warrant the charge of participation in “mass riots.” 
Furthermore, given that there is an entire spectrum of non-peaceful behaviour – only those acts
which  clearly  endanger  public  safety  should  fall  under  the  designation  of  “mass  riots.”33 The
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has stated that “mass riots are considered…a crime that
disturbs public safety and may cause serious consequences in the political, economic, or ecological
spheres, in internal affairs, or paralyse the work of governmental bodies.”  Therefore,  in order to
meet  the  threshold  of  “mass  riots,”  an  act  must  be  sufficiently  violent  that  a  person  of
reasonable firmness would fear for his/her safety. 
In summary, the definition of “mass riots” must include a  substantial number of people acting
together, committing sustained and continuous violent action to such a degree that a person of
reasonable firmness would fear for his/her safety. 
4.1. The presence of accompanying elements
As noted above, Article 212 is not applicable unless the threshold test for “mass riots” is satisfied.
Equally, Article 212 is not applicable unless “mass riots” are also accompanied by the elements
listed: violence, pogroms, arson, property destruction, the use of firearms, explosives or explosive
devices,  and  armed  resistance  to  a  public  official.  While  these  elements  are  extrinsic  to  the
definition of “mass riots,” they directly relate to the application of Article 212 and, therefore, how
to apply its provisions.34
It is worth emphasizing that these elements underscore that fact that Article 212 encompasses only
serious violence – for example, the  destruction of property (not merely property damage), or the
use of armed resistance to government officers (not merely passive resistance). 
While it is not immediately clear from the text of the Criminal Code whether the elements are to be
regarded as  alternative bases for the offences under Article 212 (one or more of which must be
present  to found a charge under Article  212) or as  comprehensive  bases (all  of which must  be
present),  the pattern of charges following the May 6 events – including those described in the
32 Article 318 can be contrasted with the more serious offence in Article 317 of the Code – Imperilling the Life of a Law
Enforcement Officer (which carries a custodial sentence of between 12-20 years, or even capital punishment or life
imprisonment). It can also be contrasted with the accompanying element in Article 212 of ‘armed resistance to a public
official’.
33 Supreme Court of Russian Federation, Case no. 80-о05−35сп, 22 December 2005.
34 In contrast, and only to the extent that the text of the Akimenkov application to the Strasbourg court is authoritative on
this matter, Mr. Kavkazskiy’s case suggests that an individual was charged with organising or participating in “mass 
disorders” even where none of the additional elements was present.
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Vladimir Akimenkov case – suggest that only one or more of these elements need be proven (in
addition to the existence of “mass riots”).35
4.2. Evidentiary Issues:
The courts  must ensure that  for each individual  charged, there is  compelling and demonstrable
evidence  of  conduct,  which  justifies  the  charge  of  “participation  in,”  “organisation  of”  or
“incitement to” “mass riots.” Such questions are highly fact-sensitive. 
“Reasonable Suspicion” and the Nature of Evidence relied Upon
Given the gravity of the offences outlined above – particularly those under Article 212 – a high
evidentiary threshold must be overcome before an individual can either be “reasonably suspected”
of having committed an offence under Article 212, or indeed be found guilty of such an offence. In
any case, the evidence relied upon must be clearly linked to the individual in question.
The requirement  in  Article  5(1)  ECHR that  there  be  “reasonable  suspicion”  to  justify  pre-trial
detention demands that the suspicion be based on reasonable grounds. This “forms an essential part
of the safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention.” The fact that a suspicion is held in good
faith is insufficient. The words “reasonable suspicion” mean “the existence of facts or information
which would satisfy an  objective  observer  that  the  person concerned may have  committed  the
offence.”36
In  this  light,  it  is  apparent  that  the  formal  notice  of  charges  brought  under  Article  212 in  the
Bolotnaya case does not itself comply with requirements in domestic law under Article 171.2.4 of
Criminal Procedure Code (CPC).37 According to Article 171.2.4 of CPC, the motives, form of guilt
and modus operandi, as well as size and type of damage, must be clearly described in the formal
notice of  charge.  The notice does  not,  however,  contain any such individualized description of
actions, which qualify under Article 212. 
Furthermore, given the significance of the facts at issue for determining the outcome cases that are
prosecuted, charges should not be based solely on the testimony of law enforcement officers (or
indeed, other undisclosed sources).38 In such circumstances, the European Court of Human Rights
has emphasized that it is vital that a tribunal exhausts every reasonable avenue in determining the
facts and corroborating such testimony.39 This must include careful examination of evidence taken
35 It is noteworthy – though unlikely to be an accurate interpretation – that the charges as described in the Akimenkov
application suggest that these accompanying elements were counted merely as  aggravating factors (rather than being
integral to the offences under Article 212(1) and (2)): The alleged participation in mass riots of four of the applicants
was stated as being ‘aggravated by’ one or more of the elements listed in Article 212 – Mr Akimenkov (“aggravated by
violence, arson and destruction of property”) Mr Barabanov and  Mr Belousov  (“aggravated by violence”), and  Mr
Savelov (“aggravated by violence, arson, destruction of property, use of firearms, explosives and explosive devices”).
36See, for example, Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 30 August 1990, Series A no. 182)
pp. 16-17, at para. 32.
37 For an English translation, see: http://legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/7 
38 As, for example, relied upon by the prosecution in the cases of Mr. Kavkazskiy (regarding his alleged participation in
“mass disorder”) and Mr Barabanov (regarding his alleged connections with football fans and groups of anarchists).
See, Akimenkov and Others v Russia (Application no. 2613/13).
39 See, for example, Kasparov v Russia (Application no. 21613/07, judgment of 3 October 2013) at para.64: “Presented
with two irreconcilable statements, the Justice of the Peace decided to base the judgment exclusively on the version put
forward by the police because they had been a ‘party with no vested interest.’ However, the Court considers that, given
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from any victims or witnesses (other than the arresting police officers). In the absence of such
detail, the arrest and detention of individuals for even the most “reprehensible” of conduct cannot
have credibility, and detention on this basis gives rise to serious human rights concerns.40
Of-course, what will be regarded as relevant in evidentiary terms will differ depending on whether
the individual is  charged with organising,  participating in, or inciting “mass riots.” These three
offences are briefly examined in turn below:
Organising “Mass Riots”
The  political  motivations  of  those  who  organized  the  March  of  Millions  are  irrelevant  to  the
question of whether an individual organized “mass riots.” Furthermore, negative inferences must
not be drawn from the fact that organizers of the March met with other opposition leaders or indeed,
with  politicians  from other  countries.  To  presume that  such  meetings  were  part  of  a  criminal
conspiracy  without  presenting  incontrovertible  evidence  of  such  is  to  eviscerate  the  right  to
participation in political life. In summary: 
• A person  who  has  an  organizational  role  in  relation  to  an  “assembly”  at  which  some
violence occurs must not be assumed, on that basis, to have organized “mass riots”;
• Unless  there  is  compelling  and  demonstrable  evidence  that  an  individual  intentionally
sought to organize serious violence (meeting the threshold described above), it cannot be
said that that person “organized mass riots”; 
• As emphasized  above,  the  fact  that  video footage  suggests  people  only  began  to  resist
physically in response to police aggression undermines the suggestion that any violence was
pre-planned.
Participating in “Mass Riots”
It is well-established in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights that “[i]t is not
necessary to restrict [a person’s] freedoms in any way unless the person in question has committed a
reprehensible act when exercising his rights.”41 In summary: 
• A person  who  participates  in  an  assembly  –  whether  lawful  or  unlawful  –  cannot  be
assumed, on that basis alone, to have participated in “mass riots”; 
• Unless  there  is  compelling  and  demonstrable  evidence  of  the  individual  actually  using
serious violence,  it  cannot be said that that person “participated in mass riots.” In other
words, as stated earlier in the report, an individual should only be punished for his or her
the significance of the disputed facts for the outcome of the case and the role of the police officer who arrested the
applicant  and  drew up  the  report,  it  was  indispensable  for  the  Justice  of  the  Peace  to  exhaust  every  reasonable
possibility of finding out exactly when and where the first applicant had been arrested.”
40 Ashughyan v. Armenia, 2008 paras.99-101. It is noteworthy that in relation to protests in the aftermath of the April
2009 elections in Moldova (when 200 persons were arrested and detained, inter alia, on charges of large-scale disorder)
the government accepted there had been a violation of the right to liberty under Article 5 ECHR. On this basis, a
friendly settlement was reached between the government and the applicants, and the applications were struck out. See,
Application no. 29837/09 by Radu Popa against Moldova, lodged on 8 June 2009; Application no. 24163/09 by Sergiu
Mocanu against Moldova, lodged on 11 May 2009; Application no.19828/09 by Stati and Marinescu against Moldova,
lodged on 16 April 2009. See also, Applications nos. 43546/05 and 844/06 by Boris Hmelevschi and Vladimir Moscalev
against Moldova lodged on 1 and 8 December 2005.
41 See, Ezelin v France (Application no. 11800/85, judgment of 26 April 1991).
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own actions and should not be held liable for the actions of other members of a group or
crowd. 
Incitement to “Mass Riots”
The  term  “incitement”  means  intentionally  advocating,  appealing  to  or  encouraging  others  to
engage in particular (unlawful) actions. Critically, however, the same distinction emphasized above
is also relevant here – the evidence must show that the incitement was to the particular offences
specified in Article 212(3): “active insubordination” – (not merely passive insubordination); “mass
riots” (satisfying the threshold described above); or violence against other persons. It is insufficient
merely to  show that  an individual  encouraged others  to  take part  in  an unlawful  assembly  (or
indeed, a peaceful sit-down protest). 
Furthermore,  the  words  used  must  themselves  be  unequivocal  in  calling  for  the  unlawful  act
specified, taking into consideration the particular circumstances. In this light, a call to “push here”
while indicating the police line (as in the case of Maria Baronova) should not be construed as
“incitement  to  use  violence  against  government  representatives”  unless  there  is  evidence  of  a
specific intention to incite such violence. Giving a direction to “push here” cannot be regarded as an
unequivocal  call  to  use  violence  in  circumstances  where  demonstrators,  seeking  to  defend
themselves,  were  being  confined  to  an  inadequate  space  and  were  fearful  that  further  police
advances would lead to potentially serious injuries.
This  argument  is  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  this  report  questions  the  very  legitimacy  and
proportionality of the restrictions imposed on the use of Bolotnaya Square (and so the actions of the
police potentially exceeded their lawful authority).
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V. Legal Regulation of Policing
Existing international standards for policing assume the observance of certain principles, rules and
regulations  that  are  described  in  international  documents,  including  in  the  Guidebook  on
Democratic Policing (OSCE, 2008)42, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (2nd edition,
OSCE, 2011), Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (UN, 1979), Basic Principles on the
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (UN, 1990), and the European Code of
Police Ethics (Council of Europe, 2011).
Special  police  task  forces  usually  act  during  mass  assemblies  in  order  to  restore  order  and
tranquillity. These forces serve to re-establish public order and safety and/or disperse an assembly
or other mass events.
The main attributes of these units are: 
• special equipment,
• special training, 
• a high level of physical conditioning, and 
• actions based on a given order.
The use of special measures is also based on several principles: 
• Advisability – the choice to use force or special measure (foreseen by the law) should be
based on the conditions of the event in question and should have a concrete aim.
• Warning – the police must call demonstrators to lawful behaviour and then warm them about
the use of certain measures if the call yields no results. (This principle is not obligatory
when urgent actions are needed to protect the lives and health of people.).
• Necessity – only those measures necessary to eliminate danger should be used. If the danger
has passed (the demonstrators obeyed police order), use of special measures is not allowed. 
• Minimization  of  consequences  –  special  measures  should  be  used  in  such  a  way as  to
minimize possible harm, not causing physical damage or provoking aggravation.
• Rendering of assistance – if a person is injured as a result police action, the officer is obliged
to provide necessary help, including medical assistance if needed. 
We have stated the main principles of policing during peaceful assemblies in order to demonstrate
that the basis for our further analysis of police actions during the events on Bolotnaya Square is
built upon clear, internationally developed criteria and is therefore objective. 
42OSCE Guidebook on Democratic Policing http://www.osce.org/spmu/23804
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VI. Analysis of 6th May 2012 Events
6.1 General Context
The March of Millions in Moscow on May 6, 2012 was planned as a major demonstration to
protest the recent Presidential election and the forthcoming inauguration of President Putin. The
assembly planned for Bolotnaya Square was in many ways the climax of a series of protests that
had  begun  in  late  2011  in  response  to  the  perceived  flaws  in  the  2011  Russian  legislative
elections. The two largest events in this cycle of protests took place on Moscow’s Bolotnaya
Square on December 4, 2011 and February 4, 2012 when tens of thousands of people mobilised
in to  voice their  demands for free and fair  elections  as well  as  for a  wider  range of issues,
including greater transparency, openness and accountability of the political system.  Many other
smaller protests took place in Moscow and other cities across Russia throughout the winter and
spring  of  2011-12.  In  most  cases,  the  authorities  tolerated  the  gatherings  with  limited
interventions or formal restrictions. 
The May 6 march and rally was thus part of a sequence of events that mobilised key groups of
citizens to protest the perceived lack of democracy in Russia. However, the assembly on May 6
was different in so far as the authorities took a much harder line towards the protest than they
had towards the two earlier events held on Bolotnaya Square in December and February. During
the May march and rally, there was a significant mobilisation of police forces, the authorities
placed constraints on access to Bolotnaya Square, and violence broke out before the majority of
demonstrators could reach the rally point. The violence resulted in the detention of numerous
protestors  as  well  as  injuries  to  both  demonstrators  and  police  officers.  As  a  result  of  the
disorder, authorities charged 27 participants with various offences, including incitement to riot,
participation in mass disorder, violence against public officials and disobeying lawful orders of
the police. 
The  following  section  sets  out  the  chronology  of  the  main  events  as  they  unfolded  in  the
vicinity of Bolotnaya Square in Moscow on May 6, 2012. The information presented here is
drawn  from  a  mixture  of  first-hand  accounts,  media  coverage,  statements  released  by  the
authorities and video footage of the events. It does not purport to be a complete account of all
activities that took place that day, but rather focuses on the attempts by those participating in
the “March of Millions” event to reach the rally site in Bolotnaya Square and the interactions
between police and participants that resulted in numerous acts of violence, the use of force and
the  detention  of  a  large  number  of  people,  some of  whom were  subsequently  charged  with
criminal offences. 
6.2. Preparations
On April 23, 2012, an official notification was submitted about a planned rally and meeting of an
estimated 5000 participants on May 6, 2012 called the “March of Millions.” The reason for the
assembly was to protest the Presidential elections and forthcoming inauguration of Vladimir Putin
as  President  on  May  7,  2012.  The  notification  for  the  March  of  Millions  was  submitted  in
compliance  with  the  law as  set  out  in  the  Federal  Law on Rallies,  Meetings,  Demonstrations,
Marches  and Picketing  (No.  54-FZ of  June  19,  2004),  which  requires  notification  to  be  given
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between 10 and 15 days in advance of a planned assembly. 
The March of Millions notification included a plan for the march to take place along Tverskaya
Street from Triumfalnaya Square to Manezhnaya Square, where a rally would be held. However, a
Moscow government representative informed event organizers that this route was unavailable due
to  a  planned  dress  rehearsal  for  the  Victory  Day  Parade.  Various  alternative  locations  were
suggested for the assembly before the Moscow Department of Regional Security announced on
May  4  that  the  event  would  follow a  similar  route  as  a  previous  rally  on  February  4,  2012.
Participants were to assemble at Kaluzhskaya Square, set off at 4:00pm along Bolshaya Yakimanka
and  Bolshaya  Polyanka  for  a  rally  in  Bolotnaya  Square,  and  disperse  at  7:30pm.  The  official
notification of approval was issued on May 4, 2012 – just two days before the beginning of the
event. 
That same day, the Moscow Department of the Russian Ministry of Interior published a plan on its
website indicating that all of Bolotnaya Square, including the public gardens, would be given over
to the rally, while the Bolshoy Kamenny Bridge would be closed to vehicles but would remain open
to pedestrians. This was the same procedure authorities adopted for the two previous rallies on Bo-
lotnaya Square on December 10, 2011 and February 4, 2012. 
The agreed plan for 6 May rally (from the website of Ministry of Internal Affairs published at 18:02
on 5 May):
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Scheme of the rally published on the web-site of the "RIA Novosti" new agency  on 4th of May.
All the bloggers and journalists referred to this map before the event.
On the evening of May 5, police cordoned off the public gardens at Bolotnaya Square. According to
Colonel Yuri Zdorenko, who was responsible for security at the location, this was done “in order to
prevent the participants from setting up a camp and from other legal acts.” Authorities received in-
formation the protestors might attempt to establish a protest camp at the site, causing them to decide
that the rally should be confined to only the Bolotnaya waterfront area – a much smaller area than
had been originally allocated for the assembly. 
A document dated May 5 outlined the police’s intentions: 
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“It was planned to fence off the public garden of the Bolotnaya Square with metal marries
and to leave only the traffic area of the Bolotnaya waterfront to the participants of the
rally…the solution concerning the scheme and the plan of public order and security provi-
sions…were not agreed on by the organizers, [and] the participants of the event and general
public were not informed of these documents since they are for internal use.” 
The police did not, however, inform the organizers of the changes they had decided upon, and they
only became aware of the police-imposed changes to the event when they arrived at the site on the
afternoon of May 6.  
The City Council did not sent out a written announcement that a special representative from the city
authorities would be present at the event, nor did the chairman of the Moscow local department of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, issue any special orders on sending a special
representative of the Ministry to the event. 
The police also took steps to limit the number of people who might attend the assembly, particularly
among  those  traveling  from  locations  outside  Moscow.  There  were  numerous  reports  of  law
enforcement authorities attempting to thwart those heading to the event.  In some places, police
detained buses and cars containing activists and confiscated their passports. Authorities held some
activists for a day or more at police stations and evacuated some railway stations. There is evidence
of police interventions designed to deter attendance at the Bolotnaya Square event in Astrakhan, St.
Petersburg, Ryazan, Samara, Smolensk, Tver, Ufa, Volgograd and Voronezh. 
The organizers requested 12 hours to set up a stage and sound equipment for the rally; however, on
the morning of May 6, the authorities only allocated six hours of advance access. Furthermore, at
1:30pm, the  police did not allow vehicles with stage equipment onto the site until they had been
searched.  The searches  revealed a small  number of tents,  and authorities detained a  number of
people as a result. The police finally allowed the truck with the stage equipment onto Bolotnaya
Square at 2:50pm, just 70 minutes before the march was due to begins.
6.3. Police Preparations 
We  chose  to  describe  police  preparations  for  the  event  separately  since,  according  to  certain
sources, they prepared to disperse the peaceful assembly from the very beginning, even though
there were no signs of violence on the part of demonstrators at the start of the event. 
According to both official and unofficial data, there were more than 12,800 MIA officials in the
centre  of  Moscow on  May  5,  2012,  including  8,094  around  the  Bolotnaya  area.  The  number
includes 5,334 police officers, including the OMON, 100 road police officers, 2,400 officers from
the internal troops (military units #3641 and 3500) and 200 Ministry of Interior cadets. In addition,
significant  forces  were  brought  in  from  the  Moscow  suburbs  (Sofrino  and  Balashiha),  St.
Petersburg,  Ivanovo,  the  Mari-El  republic,  Chelyabinsk  and  even  as  far  away  as  Yakutsk.
Authorities deployed a significant amount of equipment, including flushing machines, which were
used as barriers on Bolshoy Kamenny and Bolshoy Moskvoretsky bridges as well as on the lanes
heading to Bolshaya Yakimanka Street. 
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The “Plan for Enforcement of Public Order and Safety in Moscow on May 6, 2012” provides this
key information and highlights that police intervention was focused on preventing possible riots
rather than helping demonstrators realize their right to freedom of assembly.
This  document  highlights  the  emphasis  on  a  preventative  search  for  potential  “troublemakers”
among the demonstrators, as authorities established a special patrol group for this purpose. This
group  included  representatives  from  the  anti-extremism  department,  the  criminal  investigation
department and the department on economic crimes. Their task is described as:
“Place yourselves within the crowd of demonstrators to identify organizers and instigators
who have the aim of provoking mass riots and other grave offences, especially terrorist
attacks, to take measures to define and accuse them…If detention on the spot is not possible,
escort them and establish their identity for subsequent arrest and prosecution.  Organize
work closely with the Federal Security Service.” 
Furthermore, the authorities established a group of 350 officials to detain demonstrators on the way
to Bolotnaya Square. Their task was to form 35 groups of 10 people  “in order to remove hidden
organizers of and active participants in unlawful actions from the crowd…One of the groups should
include  officials  who have  training  in  martial  arts.  This  group should  focus  on  arresting  and
escorting  organizers  of  unlawful  actions  as  well  as  leaders  of  oppositional  organisations  and
movements, who are usually surrounded by citizens acting as guards and may actively resist the
police.” 
This plan instructed police officers to detain not only those demonstrators who performed violent
acts but all participants deemed guilty of “unlawful” action, even if those actions were peaceful.
These instructions do not comply with the international standards which state,  “In the event of
unlawful but non-violent assemblies, law enforcements officials must avoid the use of force or,
where this is not possible, limit its use to a minimum.”43
The list of impact munition that was allowed on Bolotnaya included helmets, body armour, shields,
gas  masks,  batons  (PR-73),  handcuffs,  aerosol  and  flash  bang  grenades,  multi-element  bang
grenades,  gas  grenade  launchers  and  tubeless  pistols  with  gas  and  rubber  bullets  as  well  as
propelling cartridges. Most of these munitions are needed only during special operations to stop
mass rioting. Apart from the batons and shields, none of the other munitions was used and stayed in
police trucks; however, the fact that authorities allowed and planned for the use of such munition is
indicative of the aims of the police’s preparations.44
The decision of  the  police  authorities  to place  their own restrictions on the  rally  without
discussing these plans with event organizers does not comply with best international practices
on policing assemblies. These best practices underline the importance of dialogue and efficient
cooperation between organizers and police in order to uphold public order and ensure that
events run peacefully. Even if there were concerns that some participants planned to set up
tents  on  the  Square,  the  decision  to  limit  the  allocated space  for the  rally  without  prior
notification influenced the course of events. 
43OSCE Guidebook on Democratic Policing, p  para 65.
44Yulia Poluhina, 6th May 2012. Secret training: OMON was prepared to oppose storm of Kremlin// «Noaya gazeta», 
#48, 2013, < http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/57999.html>
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Notwithstanding the fact that the event was agreed upon in advance with the authorities, the
actions  of  administrative  officials  and  the  police  did  not  comply  with  the  principle  of
presumption  in  favour  of  holding  assemblies,  meaning  the  positive  obligation  of  the
authorities to sustain the realization of citizens’ right to freedom of assembly. 
Even though the event was agreed upon just two days in advance, the authorities altered the
plan for its organization without notifying event organizers or participants.  
The international  requirement that police undertake maximum efforts  to provide efficient
cooperation  with  event  organizers  was  not  observed.  Not  all  technical  aspects  of  event
preparation  were  agreed  upon.  For  example,  there  was  no  special  contact  centre  nor
designated contact person appointed to sustain cooperation with the organizers. 
6.4. At the Assembly Point
People who planned to participate in the march began gathering at  Kaluzhskaya Square around
3pm. Authorities required all  participants to undergo a search and pass through metal detectors
before making their way to the assembly point. Police conducted searches specifically to find tents,
and due to the small number of detectors, it took up to two hours for participants to gain access to
Kaluzhskaya Square.  By the time the first people reached the rally point on Bolotnaya Square,
others were still passing through the metal detectors at Kaluzhskaya Square. At 4:00pm on May 6,
the Ministry of Interior published information on its website that some 8,000 people had passed
through the metal detectors – 3,000 more participants than had been expected. 
Those at the front of the March of Millions, including the Left Front, Anarchists and Solidarity
Movement began the walk to  Bolotnaya Square at  around 4:20pm (although some groups had
already set off in advance of the official head of the march). The participants were a diverse group,
including many elderly citizens and children along with many carrying flags and banners. Along
Bolshaya  Yakimanka  Street,  a  riot  police  squad  in  full  protective  gear  walked  alongside  the
marchers, while another group of riot police followed behind the last of them. In effect, the police
completely surrounded the march.  
6.5. Arrival at Bolotnaya Square
As the march approached Bolotnaya Square, demonstrators found that a police cordon blocked off
the greater part of the square, leaving only a narrow stretch along the waterfront for the rally. The
police established a triple cordon of officers on Bolshoy Kammeny Bridge, which prevented any
movement in the direction of the Kremlin. The first cordon was positioned close to the junction of
Maly Kamenny Bridge and the Bolotnaya waterfront. Students from the Police College and officers
of the Patrol Guard Service (without any protective equipment) made up this line. Behind them
were two rows of OMON (special police forces), a line of voluntary citizen patrol (“druzhinniki”),
and another cordon of OMON. A number of water cannons were visible between the second and
third cordons.  
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The police cordoned off the Bolshoy Kamenny Bridge (in the direction of the Kremlin) during  the
rallies on 4 February and 6 May (for comparison):
The scheme of the actual police positions and of the place of the rally:
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Limitations  the demonstrators of 6 May faced (only waterfront is available for gathering):
The  police  cordons,  which  blocked  off  movement  in  the  direction  of  the  Kremlin,  created  a
bottleneck that  slowed the march’s progress to such an extent  that it  came to a virtual stop as
demonstrators attempted to cross the bridge. Moreover, just beyond Luzhkov Bridge, the marchers
had to go through a second set of metal detectors, where progress was very slow since there were
only 14 detectors. 
6.6. The Sit-Down Protest
By 5:15pm,  the  majority  of  the  march  was  immobile.  A number  of  leaders,  including  Sergey
Udaltsov, Alexey Navalny and Ilya Yashin, encouraged demonstrators to sit down on the road in
front of the “Udarnik” cinema facing the police cordon to protest the inability of the march to
continue and to demand that they be given access to the originally allocated space for the rally on
Bolotnaya Square. An estimated 50-200 people joined the sit-down protest. The leaders stressed the
need to maintain a peaceful protest  and appealed to demonstrators to remain calm. Participants
chanted, “We will not go away” and “Police together with the people.” The leaders attempted to
address the crowds using loudspeakers, but those behind the sit-down protest could not hear or see
events as they transpired. The sit-down protest did not completely block the road, but it did restrict
the movement of those approaching the police lines and the bottleneck caused by the police cordon.
As a result, the crowd grew denser as more demonstrators arrived from Bolshaya Yakimanka street. 
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At  5:32pm,  Sergey  Udaltsov  announced  that  there  were  only  12  hours  left  before  Putin’s
inauguration and suggested the sit-down protest continue until  a number of demands were met,
including one hour on live television on federal channels for the opposition, a cancellation of the
Putin’s inauguration, and the holding of new presidential and parliamentary elections. 
At 5:42pm, the Moscow Chief Interior Department issued a statement: 
“The organizers of the rally and other participants refuse to proceed to the agreed place of the
rally (to Bolotnaya Square). They stopped on the roadway near the “Udarnik” theatre. Some of
them  sat  on  the  ground  and  thus  blocked  the  movement  of  the  column.  Despite  repeated
warnings on the part of the police to proceed to the place of the rally, they won’t move thereby
creating a real threat of a jam and trauma for participants. An inquiry commission is working
on the spot to document their actions related to appeals to mass public disorder with a view to
further consider the issue of instituting criminal proceedings.” 
Some demonstrators appeared to become frustrated with standing and waiting and began to walk
away. Some tried to pass through the police cordon to leave the area, but the police refused to let
them through. Instead,  they were directed to go back through the crowd to Bolshaya Polyanka
Street, even though this was practically impossible. 
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Looking back from the first few rows of people at  the Maly Kamenny bridge, it is clear that the
passage back to Polyanka is also closed – this is where all the new demonstrators are coming from,
propping up the first rows stuck at the cordon:
The  police  used  loud  speakers  to  inform  demonstrators  of  the  rally  location.  They  asked
participants to pass directly to Bolotnaya Square and not stop at the bridge, despite the fact that the
major part of the square was closed to demonstrators. They announced that all actions on the bridge
could be considered illegal. However, given the poor quality of the sound equipment, only those
nearest the police could hear this information; the majority of protesters did not hear the police
instructions. 
The positioning of the police cordon at the end of Maly Kammeny Bridge served to create a
significant bottleneck that effectively brought the march to an almost complete standstill. As
we will discuss below, the police made little attempt to coordinate their actions with event
organizers and prominent figures or find ways to reduce the build-up of demonstrators in a
confined space.  
As tensions grew, the crowd came to an effective standstill,  and the police demonstrated a
serious lack of negotiation skills. Instead of using mediation or dialogue to reduce tensions, the
police instead resorted to threats and pressure. The police could have tried to relieve pressure
on the crowd and allowed protesters to reach the rally site by repositioning their officers and
moving the front line.
6.7. Attempts to Communicate with the Police
From the moment difficulties first  arose for demonstrators attempting to  cross Maly Kammeny
Bridge,  demonstrators  made  repeated  attempts  to  negotiate  with  the  police  over  moving  their
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cordons to allow protesters onto Bolotnaya Square. 
Dmitry Oreshkin, a member of the Presidential Human Rights Council, and Member of Parliament
Gennady Gudkov tried to talk to  police authorities around 5:30pm, but  there was no response.
Shortly  after  participants  broke through the police cordon at  6:20pm, a  group of  human rights
activists  spoke to  Colonel  Birukov, head of the Moscow Interior Department’s press centre.  At
7:00pm,  MP Ilya  Ponomarev tried  to  stop  violence  during  the  clashes  on  the  embankment  by
speaking to the authorities, but he did not get a positive response. 
Many  of  those  involved  in  organising  the  event  stated  that  they  tried  to  engage  with  police
throughout the day to ensure the event took place in a peaceful manner. 
Nadezhda Mityushkina: “I tried unsuccessfully to find the responsible people in the Ministry of
Internal Affairs in order to solve organizational problems. I knew whom to contact in case we
needed help when issues arose…Only at 6:00-6:30pm did a police officer approach me. I knew
from previous  demonstrations  that  he was a senior  officer responsible  for  communication with
event organizers. I knew him as “San Sanych” (Alexander), and he told me that the authorities had
suspended the demonstration. As one of the rally organizers, he told me to announce that the event
was over from the stage, which I did following our conversation.” 
Igor Bakirov: “A police officer in a colonel’s uniform contacted me only once, and I showed him
the documents verifying my credentials as an event organizer. Later clashes with the police erupted,
I couldn’t find anyone with whom to communicate and cooperate.” 
Sergey Davidis: “I personally did not meet nor have time to get into contact with the authorities
regarding the fences set up around the perimeter of the rally. I assumed some other organizers had
already spoken to the authorities regarding this  issue or were speaking with them at that time.
There was no one to contact and nothing to talk about. I only saw OMON officers who behaved
aggressively and were not predisposed to get into a conversation.”
Some of the protesters also spoke to police and attempted to separate the combating parties and to
stop the violence.
International best practices highlight the importance of police maintaining communications
with assembly organizers in order to adequately deal  with any problems that might arise
during an event. In this case, organizers and other prominent participants tried to engage in
dialogue with the police, but the authorities were not interested. 
There was a lack of effective coordination between the responsible police officials and the
organizers of the assembly, which resulted in the inability to respond quickly or effectively
to the deteriorating protest environment.  
6.8. At the Stage Area
From around 5:30pm, announcements from the stage informed people that the speakers were unable
to get  to  the rally  point  and had begun a sit-down protest.  Speakers  made repeated  appeals  to
participants to return to the Udarnik cinema area to join protesters there. Some participants did try
to move back along the waterfront, but the police would not allow them to go back through the
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metal detectors. As tension mounted, some of the metal detectors were knocked over, and police
allowed demonstrators to move back to the Udarnik. 
After  a  few minutes,  the police  again imposed a  cordon across  the waterfront  at  the  Luzhkov
Bridge,  and no one  was  allowed  into  or  out  of  the  rally  area.  This  divided the  crowd on the
Bolotnaya waterfront into several sections, each one blocked by the police on three sides and by the
Obvodnoy Channel on the fourth. Some people did manage to get through the police lines, but the
police then blocked the embankment with more cordons – one by the metal detectors and another
across the end of the Luzhkov Bridge. Those trapped between the police lines were not allowed to
exit either towards the Maly Moskvoretsky Bridge or the Udarnik cinema. 
6.9. The Police Cordon is Broken
Between 5:38 and 5:50pm, a large number of OMON officers in full protective gear began to move
forward from behind vehicles blocking the Bolshoy Kamenny Bridge, while a number of police
vehicles used to hold arrested citizens were driven towards the Udarnik cinema. 
At 5:55pm, as people tried to move through the narrow gap between the police cordon and the
waterfront to reach Bolotnaya Square, the police line moved two steps forward, further pressing the
crowd. This in turn generated a counter response from the crowd, and protesters began pushing
back. In several places, the police cordon broke, and a few dozen people found themselves in the
empty space behind the first police line. It is impossible to determine whether the breakthrough was
the result of conscious action by sections of the crowd or if the police cordon simply broke due to
the pressure from such a large number of people. 
Some of those who made it past the police lines were young men, but there were also many elderly
citizens and others who did not resemble street fighters. Those who found themselves behind the
police cordon did not act in an aggressive manner but appeared to move towards the entrance to the
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Bolotnaya Gardens, the supposed rally point. 
The first seconds after the “breakthrough”: elderly people easily  pass by (on the left, the man
wearing a blue jeans costume is Artem Savelov).  A shot from the MinaevLive broadcast:
Different demonstrators  reacted very differently to the breaking of the police line. Some tried to
move away, others called for people to break through the cordon, while some tried to restrain the
crowd from pressing those  who were  still  taking part  in  the  sit-down protest.  As pressure and
tension grew, the sit-down protesters stood up rather than risk being trampled. There was a high
degree of confusion, and people were not clear on what was happening. 
The numbers of people trying to get onto the Bolotnaya waterfront increased the compression
of the crowd and the police cordon. There is little indication that demonstrators were engaged
in acts of deliberate violence towards the authorities at this stage.  Rather,  the crowd had
limited room to move, and the pressure increased further as others began to move towards the
sit-down protestors from the stage area. When the police moved forward, this created further
pressure, and people began to push back, causing the police lines to give way. 
6.10. The Molotov Cocktail
Just after the breakthrough at approximately at 6:00pm, a single Molotov cocktail was thrown
from the crowd. It landed behind the police ranks and ignited the trousers of Valentin Yastrubin -
etskiy, a 74 year old demonstrator who had passed through the cordon. The police used their fire
extinguishers to put out the fire. This was the only such incident recorded during the day, but it
was noted in many police reports and prosecution files in the plural,  i.e.  “throwing Molotov
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cocktails.” As a result, authorities considered the incident an act of arson, one of the essential
elements of a “riot.”
The moment when the Molotov cocktail falls: 
6.11. Agent Provocateurs?
The throwing of a Molotov cocktail, even if only one, indicates that there were people in the crowd
who were willing to use violence against the police. As tensions escalated at the bottleneck near the
Udarnik cinema, eyewitnesses suggest that some demonstrators instigated acts of violence towards
the police and called on protesters to break through to Manezhnaya Square. Many witness state-
ments and media stories claimed that there were representatives of pro-Kremlin youth movements
in the protest who tried to encourage demonstrators to act aggressively.
Those detained and arrested appear to have been mainly peaceful demonstrators, and it is
thus important to analyse who was responsible for the initial acts of violence and aggression.
Were they agents-provocateurs or rally participants?
6.12. The First Detentions
Soon after the cordons were broken, the authorities began to detain those who remained behind the
police lines, taking them to special holding areas. The police also arrested some protesters at the
front of the crowd who had not tried to break through the cordon. The police cordon was fully
restored after about four minutes. A number of those currently facing trial were detained at this
phase of the police operation.
 
Detention of Artem Savelov: Savelov, who does not belong to any movement or party, was at the
front of the crowd facing the police cordon when the police line broke. Like many others, he moved
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behind the police lines. Video footage showed him looking around, tying his shoe and walking in
the square. He was detained at 6:03pm.
Artyom Savelyev after the break through (seated right):
Detention of Vladimir Akimenkov:  Vladimir Akimenkov is an activist of the “Left Front” party.
Authorities detained him at 6:05pm and accused him of throwing a “long object” at a police officer
and of involvement in rioting. Akimenkov came to the demonstration in a shirt and tie. He suffers
from very poor vision and was detained before any violence had started. He has been in jail since
June 10, 2012.
A minute or so after the police cordon broke, another gap appeared. This allowed some protesters
behind police lines to return to the main body of the march, including Boris Nemtsov and Alexey
Navalny. Shortly after, a newly arrived second rank of riot police squeezed others back into the
crowd. 
A number of those who were among the first to be detained appear to have done nothing
wrong, apart from being in the wrong place when the police cordon was breached. There does
not appear to have been any systematic attempt to attack the police line at this time.  The
cordon appears to have been breached simply due to the heightened pressure of the crowd in a
contained physical space. 
At about 6:05pm, the authorities deployed additional police to help restore the cordon near the
Udarnik cinema and to detain those who had broken through police lines. Those demonstrators who
were at the front of the police cordon were either pushed towards the waterfront or in the direction
of the Maly Kamenny Bridge. The police used their batons to move the demonstrators and arrested
a number of people even though they had not taken part in the breakthrough of the police cordon.
  
In a live commentary a correspondent of MinaevLive stated that: “Now the OMON are taking ac-
tion. They force their way into the crowd and split up into groups of five. They snatch one protestor
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out, three grab the demonstrator and two beat off those defending the demonstrator. I don’t see any
basic principle for the detention. I cannot understand why they pick particular people. The situation
has calmed down, but now they come and snatch people from the crowd.” 
 
Bystanders state that the police first used batons at 6pm. Rather than attempt to allow people
to move along to the rally site, the police chose to use their batons to try to force people back.
There does not appear to have been any justification for the use of force at this time, and its
use only seems to have increased tensions between the police and march participants. 
International  best  practices  suggest  that  even  though  the  police  possess  the  power  to
intervene, disperse an unlawful assembly or use force, this does not mean that such powers
should be exercised. Overly heavy-handed or zealous efforts to assert order are likely to cause
considerable damage to the relationship between the police and society. The police action as
described above clearly does not meet these standards. 
International  best  practices  also  recommend  that  the  authorities  should  give  protesters
sufficient  time  to  comprehend  police  warnings  and  instructions  in  order  to  respond
appropriately. Law enforcement officials did not respect these standards. Furthermore, such
warnings and instructions must be brought to the attention of all protesters, if possible, and
not simply to those closest to the authorities. 
6.13. At the Stage Area
At  6:10pm,  Sergey  Udaltsov, Alexey  Navalny  and  Boris  Nemtsov managed  to  walk  from the
Udarnik cinema  to the stage at the waterfront followed by a large number of people.  A police
cordon blocked access to the stage, but they were allowed through. As they tried to start the rally,
the police intervened. According to one of the organizers, Nadezhda Mityushkina, “Some police
officers came up to me and said that the rally was over. I tried to negotiate with them, but it was no
use. Then I climbed the stage and announced the end of the rally. The police cut off both the music
and the microphones.” 
Udaltsov announced at 6:23pm from the stage through a megaphone that  the police had  cut the
electricity and called for “ongoing protest action.” OMON officers then detained Sergey Udaltsov
on stage and shortly afterwards detained Boris Nemtsov and Alexey Navalny as well. By 6:50pm,
the organizers began to disassemble the stage.  
The police  chose  to  cut  off  the  sound equipment  at  the  very  moment  some of  the  key
figures in the assembly had reached the rally site. This action meant the rally site could no
longer serve as a focal point for demonstrators, causing participants to attempt to move
away from the rally location. A lack of sound equipment also prevented organizers from
informing demonstrators about the situation and from advising them on what to do. All of
this contributed to a sense of confusion and uncertainty among march participants.
 
6.14. Tension and Violence 
In the two hours between 6pm and 8pm, the demonstration was marked by two distinct types of
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activity.  For  much of  the  time,  demonstrators  and the  police  stood face  to  face  without  much
happening. These moments were interspersed with periods when the police advanced and the crowd
moved back. There does not appear to have been any clear reason for the police decision to advance
other than to divide the crowd up into smaller sections. More than anything, the police advances
served to  raise tensions  and provoke some members of the crowd to push back. There is  little
evidence that demonstrators initiated the violence. Rather, they appear to have become aggressive
only in response to the authorities’ advances. 
During these interchanges some protesters threw objects at the police, and the police used their
batons freely. The crowd threw plastic bottles, shoes and umbrellas – items brought for routine
purposes, not with the intent of being used as weapons. As a result of police interventions, the
authorities  arrested  a  number  of  demonstrators  despite  there  being  little  evidence  from  video
material  that  those detained were actively involved in  acts  of violence.  Rather,  they were easy
targets for the police.  
Five of those subsequently charged were involved in incidents during the first major police effort to
divide the crowd. 
Detention of Stepan Zimin: Between 6:16pm and 6:20pm, the authorities detained Stepan Zimin
when a police charge divided the crowd at exactly the spot where he was standing. He tried to move
away but was detained by the police. He was accused of repeatedly throwing stones at the police.
Alexandra Dukhanina: At 6.17pm, the demonstrators moved back, and a space was created around
the police dealing with those who had been detained. Video footage shows Alexandra Dukhanina
moving forward and throwing something in the direction of the police. 
Sergei   Krivov:  During an early police advance, one demonstrator was knocked to the ground. A
crowd gathered around her, while a woman in a light blouse filmed the incident. A police officer
pushed the woman, and she dropped her camera.  Sergei Krivov is seen exchanging slight pushes
with the police officer before they move off in different directions. 
Elena Kohtareva: At the same time, Elena Kohtareva can be seen standing in the front row of
demonstrators and throwing what appears to be a plastic bottle towards the police. 
Alexey Polihovich: As the riot police tried to arrest demonstrators, others in the crowd tried to
prevent them being taken away by the police. Alexey Polihovich is seen holding on to a man in a
green shirt while a policeman hits him on the head with his baton. Polihovich moved off to the side
and can be seen holding his head.
6.15. Resistance 
Resistance to police actions increased as events developed. Initially people did not react to the po-
lice, but once police officers began to grab demonstrators from the crowd, others began to resist.
Some participants, mainly young men wearing black hoods and masks, threw objects at the police.
Other demonstrators tried to prevent the police from detaining people in the crowd by pulling parti-
cipants back from the OMON and forming a human chain. Video footage suggests that participants
only began to resist physically in response to police aggression. 
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In some cases, particularly near the waterside, protesters resisted more actively by punching
or hitting police officers. Others threw a variety of objects, including broken asphalt, bottles
and sticks. Some also appear to have brought some kind of chemical spray, which may have
caused the facial burns some police officers subsequently reported. 
6.16. Preventing Demonstrators from Leaving
After the initial outburst of violence, some protesters tried to move away from the Bolotnaya water-
front area. In particular, those with children, women, the disabled,  and the elderly attempted to
leave the protest. However, eyewitnesses reported numerous cases in which police officers preven-
ted demonstrators from leaving and only allowed people to leave after long and heated discussions.
It is not clear why the authorities prevented demonstrators from leaving the site, as this would have
helped reduce congestion in the waterfront area. 
At around 6:20pm, the police announced that the rally was cancelled and asked protesters to dis-
perse. Police used a loudspeaker to state, “Dear citizens, we earnestly ask you not to disturb public
order! Otherwise, in accordance with the law, we will have to use force! Please, leave here, and do
not stop. Go to the metro.” Although the police used a loudspeaker, the announcement was not loud
enough to reach the majority of the crowd. It is likely that only those nearest to the loudspeakers
could have heard the call to disperse.  
There was confusion over police demands because at the same time the police gave orders for the
crowd to disperse, Colonel Birukov, head of the Moscow Chief Police Department’s press service,
told a group of human rights defenders (including Vladimir Lukin, Dmitri Oreshkin, Victor Davy-
dov and Nikolai Svanidze) that demonstrators could continue to Bolotnaya Square to take part in
the rally. 
6.17. Incident with the Barriers 
After the riot police’s first advance, demonstrators used metal barriers installed near the waterfront
to protect themselves from further police raids. Some participants moved the barriers to act as a buf-
fer between the protesters and the police, limiting police ability to advance into the crowd. In re-
sponse, the police used their batons to force demonstrators to release the barriers, which they then
removed. 
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There is video evidence of flares thrown between demonstrators and police, although it is not clear
who initiated this action. Police used a fire extinguisher to put out a flare on at least one occasion,
but eyewitnesses saw police officers pick up flares and throw them into the crowd on at least two
other occasions, which is an example of unnecessary aggression and provocation by the police. 
Sergei   Krivov, Incident 2:   According to the investigation, Sergei Krivov grabbed a baton from a
police officer at 6:22pm while standing at the barriers. When the officer tried to take it back, Krivov
allegedly punched the officer on the hand. However, video evidence suggests that Krivov did not
take the baton from the officer but merely grabbed it from another demonstrator and passed it back
into the crowd. Video footage does not show any contact between Krivov and the police officer. 
After police removed the barriers, they moved into the crowd and detained protesters who got in
their way. Protesters began to move back towards the waterfront and Maly Kamenny Bridge. Video
footage shows some people throwing chunks of asphalt at the police. 
Alexandra   Dukhanina,  Incident  2:   At  6:26pm,  Alexandra Dukhanina  ran forward  and allegedly
threw pieces of asphalt at the police. 
Sergei   Krivov Incident  3:  Around the same time,  according to  the formal  investigation,  Sergei
Krivov was recorded pulling a detained person from the police. 
After demonstrators broke through the police cordon, the police struggled initially to restore
their lines. Once they were able to accomplish this, they appeared to adopt an aggressive ap-
proach to crowd management. Rather than seek to contain the large number of demonstrators
and facilitate their access to the rally site, they instead chose to split the crowd into smaller
groups and detain those who resisted or failed to move away quickly enough. This in turn led
to an increase in resistance from the largely peaceful crowd, which was countered by an in-
creasing use of force by the police. International best practices would have argued for a more
calculated police response that sought to maintain their lines while using minimal force to en-
courage protesters to move to another location.  
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6.18. At the Waterfront 
Initially, only a small number of demonstrators threw objects at the police, while the majority of
people detained did not offer any resistance. As police interventions increased, so too did the scale
of active resistance. After this, most violent clashes occurred near the waterfront. 
By 6:30pm, the crowd at the corner of Maly Kamenny Bridge and the waterfront was cut in two.
Those on Maly Kamenny Bridge were pushed in the direction of Bolshaya Polyanka Street, while
those on the waterfront were cut off from both Bolshoy and Maly Kamenny bridges. 
Incident involving  Mikhail   Kosenko (since convicted):  There is footage of Mikhail Kosenko during
one of the police advances at 6:30pm standing in the front row of demonstrators along the water-
front near the location of police clashes with Makism Luzyanin (also convicted) and an unknown
person in a grey hoodie and light shirt.  The authorities accused Kosenko of involvement in rioting
and of assaulting a police officer and taking his ammunition. This is not seen in video footage. 
Sergei Krivov, Incident 4: At 6:36pm, a group of officers advanced into the crowd to try to grab
demonstrators. According to the investigation, Sergei Krivov held the hands of one policeman be-
hind his back, thereby preventing him from detaining anyone. In response, another police officer
knocked Krivov to the ground and beat him first with his fist and then with his baton.
Incident involving Ilya Guschin and Tyrana Varzhabetyan: Ilya Guschin is accused of grabbing a
policeman  at 6:45pm  and holding his helmet and bulletproof vest in order to prevent the officer
from detaining protesters in the crowd. At the same time, an elderly lady, Turana Varzhabetyan,
tried to protect a man police were beating. The police officer hit her, and she collapsed. Emergency
services then evacuated her and diagnosed her with trauma and a concussion.  The authorities did
not record her injuries as having resulted from the use of force by the police. 
Between 6:51 and 6:54pm, as the OMON officers continued their attempts to detain participants, a
number of unidentified young protesters ran into the space between the demonstrators and police,
throwing pieces of asphalt and other objects at the police. Rather than pursue those who had thrown
objects at them, the police chose to detain some demonstrators standing nearby. 
Detention of Denis Luckevich: At  6:51pm, Denis Luckevich was at  the front of the crowd ob-
serving events. None of the video evidence suggests that he was involved in any acts of violence or
physical resistance. Police made several attempts to detain him, but he managed to escape each
time, although they were able to grab his shirt. Without his shirt, he was very visible in the crowd.
When the police eventually detained him, they beat him, and he fell to the ground. 
Detention of Alexey Polihovich: Alexey Polihovich is accused of participating in a mass riot. This
accusation is based on the fact that at 6:52pm, he tried to help a protestor get away from authorities.
Early in 2013, Vladimir Putin said in an interview that it was unfair to keep people in prison if they
had not used violence against the police. Shortly after this interview aired, an OMON officer repor-
ted that Polihovich hit him on the hand during the May 6 events. 
Beating of Alexey Gaskarov: At 6:52pm, a group of  OMON officers grabbed Alexey Gaskarov
from the crowd and knocked him to the ground. One of officers kicked him in the face, inflicting
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serious injury. This took place in full view of surrounding demonstrators who reacted angrily. In the
uproar, Gaskarov was able to creep away, and the police appeared to lose interest in him.
Yaroslav Belousov: At 6:54pm, the  police advanced towards the waterfront parapet, provoking a
range of responses. Yaroslav Belousov picked up a lemon from the ground and threw it at the po-
lice. The authorities accused him of throwing “a yellow object of round form, such as a billiard
ball,” which injured an OMON officer.
Nikolay Kavkazskiy Incident: At 6:54pm, several young people ran  between the police and the
demonstrators and threw pieces of asphalt, sticks and flagpoles. The police used their batons in an
attempt to prevent the demonstrators from disappearing into the crowd. This in turn provoked an ag-
gressive response on the part of other demonstrators, who attacked several isolated OMON officers.
The police line retreated, and Kavkazskiy ran after the other demonstrators. One officer hit Kavkaz-
skiy several times with his baton, and someone from within the crowd sprayed something at both
the police and Kavkazskiy. Video evidence suggests that Kavkazskiy tried to escape from both the
gas and police baton while protecting himself with his hands, but official documentation interpreted
this action as an attempt by Kavkazskiy to hit a police officer. 
Egor Lazarev: At 6:54pm, as police moved away from the demonstrators, one OMON officer hit
Egor Lazarev on the jaw. Lazarev had been standing calmly in the crowd. As Lazarev collapsed,
nearby demonstrators shouted, “He has been killed!”
6.19. Clearing the Waterfront
Around 6:54pm, the police cordon that acted as a barrier along the waterfront near the Luzhkov
Bridge was removed, and demonstrators were able to move freely along the Bolotnaya waterfront.
Approximately 15 minutes later, some 200 police officers in protective equipment who had formed
a cordon at the Luzhkov Bridge began pushing protesters in the direction of Lavrushinsky Lane,
which runs from Bolotnaya Square to the Tretyakovskaya metro station. At the same time, police
began to push people back along the Bolotnaya waterfront from the Luzhkov Bridge towards the
Udarnik cinema. Those who remained on the waterfront linked arms in passive resistance. The po-
lice pushed forward, divided the crowd and began to detain demonstrators.  
The moment police disperse the crowd:
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Beating of Vladimir Zakharov: At 7:34pm, a police baton hit Vladimir Zakharov over the head. A
police officer also beat journalist Evgeniy Shipilov, who collapsed as a result. The police took Shi-
pilov away towards the Udarnik cinema. 
Detention of Yaroslav Belousov: At 7:38pm, Yaroslav Belousov was part of the chain of demon-
strators at the waterfront who remained on the square. OMON officers grabbed him and carried him
away by his arms and legs. He fell to the ground several times. 
Detention of Mikhail Kosenko: During another police attempt to disperse demonstrators, authorities
detained  Mikhail Kosenko.
At about 7:47pm, Vladimir Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, stated on a live broadcast on the
Dozhd channel, “From my point of view, the police acted gently. I would have preferred tougher ac-
tions.” Around this time, authorities created a corridor to allow demonstrators to leave the Bolot-
naya area. 
6.20. Dispersing the Remaining Demonstrators 
At 19:53 a group of OMON officers appeared from the bushes of Bolotnaya Gardens and divided
those demonstrators that remained on the square. Those on one side were able to move towards
Maly Kamenny Bridge, while those on the other remain totally blocked between police lines.
Detention of Andrey Barabanov (Case of 12): At 19:55 a group of OMON officers began to use
their batons to disperse the remaining demonstrators. As the route to the Moskvorecky Bridge was
blocked by the police the demonstrators had no exit and there was a confrontation between the
demonstrators and the police. Andrey Barabanov was detained at this point. He resisted and was hit
at least once in the kidney area. As the police carried him to the police vehicle he fell down several
times.
Incident involving Leonid Kovyazin (Case of 12) and Dmitry Rukavishnikov (defendant): At 20:01
some  of  those  still  on  the  waterfront  began  to  overturn  the  toilet cabins,  possibly  to  protect
themselves from the advancing OMON officers. However, this had little impact. Leonid Kovyazin
and  Dmitry  Rukavishnikov  have  been  charged  with  participation  in  mass  rioting  for  their
involvement in this activity.
At  20:08  the  last  groups  of  people  slowly  left  the  waterfront  along  a  corridor  formed  by  the
policemen. The police also began to move people away from the Kadashevskaya waterfront on the
other side of the Obvondoy Channel. Some people were detained, while others were pushed along
Bolshaya Polyanka Street in the direction of the Lavrushinsky Lane.
Between 21:00 and 22:00 around two thousand demonstrators  moved along Bolshaya Ordynka
Street  chanting  slogans.  They  were  joined  by  activists  from  the  Left  Front  and  Solidarity
movements and were followed by OMON. The demonstrators left  Bolshaya Ordynka and went
along Pyatnickaya Street walking along the road in the opposite direction to the traffic. Passing
drivers honked their horns in support of the demonstrators and the OMON officers began to detain
people and actively disperse the column. 
The police were particularly aggressive to people in the  Lavrushinsky Lane, Bolshaya Ordynka
Street  and Pyatnitskaya Street area between 21.30 and 21.45, which were crowded with people
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peacefully leaving the demonstration area. The police detained some people in the street and others
in cafés, for no particular reason. Others were pushed into metro stations. 
The police made a concerted effort from around 20.00 to 22.00 to clear people away from the
Bolotnaya waterfront and adjacent areas, perhaps to ensure that there was no possibility of
anyone establishing a camp protest on the site. There does not appear to be much evidence of
violence among those in the area and the police could have utilized less aggressive tactics to
encourage people to move away. There are indications that the police action served to provoke
resistance from among those still in the Bolotnaya area and which in turn was met by an esca-
lation in the use of force and detentions by the police.  
6.21. Detentions
The  authorities  detained  a  large  number  of  protesters  after  the  May 6  demonstration.  Reports
claimed that police arrested 200 people just 20 minutes after the police cordon broke. According to
the Moscow Internal Affairs Department, the authorities detained a total of 656 demonstrators. In
many cases, video evidence suggests that the detentions were unjustified, as the police did not only
detain those who were involved in acts of aggression but often grabbed peaceful demonstrators who
happened to be close to the OMON. Most reports describe those involved in the violence as young
men in black goodies and/or masks; however, few of those detained meet this description. 
The police often acted aggressively while detaining people. Physical force was applied with no re-
gard for the age or gender of participants. Authorities injured some protesters in the process of de-
tention, and others loss consciousness. Regardless, OMON officers carried or dragged protesters to
prison trucks rather than to locations where they could have received emergency medical aid.
 
The methods the police used in detaining rally participants raise two key issues related to li -
ability and the use of force. It appears that the police arrested a number of demonstrators
who were not involved in the violence but happened to be nearby when the police advanced
into the crowd. The European Court of Human Rights has argued that people should only be
detained or punished for their own actions and should not be held liable for the actions of oth-
er members of a group or crowd. 
Video evidence from the event also suggests that police used disproportionate force on a num-
ber of occasions, including an indiscriminate use of batons, use of force against peaceful civil-
ians and use of force when an individual was lying on the group or already detained. While
defensive use of force may have been appropriate in some circumstances, police action went
beyond this level in many cases. International best practices require that there should be an
investigation of police use of force, and officers must be held accountable, especially in cases
when civilians were injured. 
6.22. Injuries to Demonstrators
In the Bolotnaya criminal cases 55 people have been identified as victims, all of them police of-
ficers. Officially, there was only one civilian victim: 74-year-old Valentin Yastrubinetskiy, who was
injured by a Molotov cocktail. However, live media coverage of the event noted numerous demon-
strators who were injured as well as detained protesters who were bloodied or bleeding. 
Leaked broadcasts of radio conversations by paramedics reveal that a number of protesters suffered
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from head wounds. One doctor declares, “During my shift, there were 25 calls, and among those 13
patients were hospitalized.” As there was only one reference to an injured police officer, it can be
assumed that most of those hospitalized were demonstrators injured on Bolotnaya Square. 
The “Public Verdict” Foundation collected information that indicates  65 people received medical
assistance during the rally, but only three of those patients were police officers. At least 16 people
suffered head injuries; however, since those detained could only go to the hospital following their
release, the total number of injured must be larger than this. 
Most of those injured did not lodge official complaints against the police and have refused to bear
witness in court. In those cases where participants did file claims of illegal use of police force, the
authorities rejected these claims out of hand, refuted them after some form of inquiry or never re-
sponded. There have been no criminal cases relating to the use of force on civilians apart from one
in the regional court of Saratov, which found a protester to be the subject to the use of force during
his detention. The court ordered that this protester be paid compensation in the amount of 20,000
rubles. 
Those who received injuries at the hands of the police include:
Aleksey Aniskin – suffered a head wound and concussion and was hospitalized for 10 days. He
submitted an application to the Internal Security Directorate and received a formal reply stating that
he had not been detained.
Alexander Eliseev – beaten with batons; he submitted a complaint on May 29, 2012. He received a
refusal to initiate criminal proceedings. 
Aleksey Gaskarov – an anti-fascist activist, who received three stitches for a head wound follow-
ing a beating by an officer of the Special Police Unit (OMON). On May 28, 2012, Aleksey Gas-
karov sent an application concerning the illegal use of police force and attached a video of the in-
cident. The authorities have not sent an official response. On April 28, 2013, the authorities detained
Gaskarov and accused him of participation in mass riots and using force against the police. 
Nadir Fattiahetdinov –badly beaten on the arms, stomach and liver area. His application for in-
stigation of a criminal case was declined.
 
Vadim Kantor – correspondent for the Moscow News, punched in the head. He decided against
submitting a complaint against the police. 
Egor Lazarev – eco-activist, punched by an OMON officer. He was first thought to have died but
only lost consciousness. The authorities rejected his application for the initiation of a criminal case. 
Denis  Lutskevich –  beaten  with  batons.  A medical  and legal  investigation  determined that  he
suffered personal injury. The authorities arrested Lutskevich and accused him of participation in a
mass riot and use of force against the police. The criminal investigator refused to open a criminal
case on his behalf. 
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Denis Luckevich:
Lubov Novoselskaya – caught by a police advance and fell, resulting in a contused haematoma of
the left thigh. Authorities rejected her application for a criminal case.
Evgeny Pajitnov – had his hand broken while being detained in a side street off Lavrushinsky. His
application to the Internal Security Department of the Police was redirected to the Investigation
Committee, who responded that it was not possible to identify the guilty party.
Evgeny Shipilov – correspondent for Gazeta.Ru, beaten with batons until he lost consciousness. He
intended to send an application to the Investigation Committee but changed his mind. 
Turane Varjabetian –beaten, received medical assistance for a concussion. She submitted an ap-
plication but has not received an official response. 
Alexander Cheparukhin – beaten by an officer of Special Police Force while going to the metro
away from the rally at the corner of Bolshoy and Maly Tolmachevsky Streets. He decided against
submitting a complaint against the police. 
Viktor Zaharov – received a baton wound to the head and was taken to the hospital. He wrote
complaints to the Investigative Committee and to the General Persecutor's Office. In April 2013, the
authorities sent a 25 page official response, which did not make clear what decision they would take
regarding his claim. 
At least 15 other people who submitted formal complaints against the police have had their claims
rejected or have not received a response. Those in more official positions received a similar re-
sponse when they requested investigations into the excessive use of police force. 
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In May 2012, Ilia Ponomarev and 20 other parliamentary deputies sent a request to the Moscow
prosecutor’s office concerning the use of force against protesters on Bolotnaya Square. They identi-
fied specific  cases,  and attached photo or video materials  to each.  In each case,  the regulatory
agency found no grounds for opening a criminal case against the police officers involved. 
Lev Ponomarev, the executive director of the social movement “For Human Rights,” requested that
O.N. Kostina, chairman of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Moscow Public Council, examine the
use of illegal force by police officers against four citizens. He has yet to receive a response. 
The focus of the state authorities since May 6, 2012 has been on prosecuting citizens for parti-
cipation in the march and rally and the use of force against police officers. In contrast, there
has been virtually no investigation into the use of force by police officers against the demon-
strators, nor any consideration of the legality and proportionality of any use of police force.
There is evidence that a number of demonstrators suffered serious head wounds and injuries
to other parts of the body. All complaints about police activities on May 6, 2012 should be in-
vestigated by the authorities. 
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VII.  Particular  Conclusions  on  Police  Actions  during  the
Preparation for and Holding of the Events 
1. The actions of the authorities during negotiations over the event do not fully comply with the
principle  of  presumption  in  favour  of  holding  assemblies,  that  is  the  authorities’ obligation  to
facilitate the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and to promote the holding assemblies in
places preferred by the organizers. 
a. The event was agreed upon just two days before it was to take place, and the authorities
change the plan for its implementation without notifying organizers or participants.
b. The designated location for the event, contrary to the agreed plan, was not large enough for
all  the participants,  while the routes to the location were limited or blocked. All of this
endangered  the  participants’ safety  and  provoked  conflicts.  Police  efforts  to  regulate  a
peaceful  assembly  were  aimed at  cordoning off  demonstrators  in  order  to  prevent  their
ability to move freely. 
c. The authorities sent a special police unit that was equipped for the use of force to the rally; 
d. There is some indication that the police had prepared to terminate or disperse the peaceful
assembly from the very beginning, even though there were no signs of violence from the
demonstrators at the start of the event;
e. According to the “Plan for Enforcement of Public Order and Safety in Moscow on May 6,
2012,”  police  officials  were  instructed  to  detain  not  only  those  demonstrators  who
performed  violent  acts  but  all  participants  committing  “unlawful”  actions,  even  if  they
happened to be peaceful.
f. The police did not inform the demonstrators about their action and plans.
2. The authorities placed the responsibility for dealing with more demonstrators than agreed upon
on the organizers, which does not comply with existing international standards. A larger number of
demonstrators, even if the action was planned to be small, may not be considered to violate the law
so long as the assembly remains peaceful.  
3.  The  police  did  not  fulfil  requirements  set  by  international  standards  that  they  effectively
cooperate with rally organizers. The police did not inform the participants about their objectives nor
their plan of action. They did not discuss with nor agree with the organizers upon technical aspects
of the preparation for and holding of the event.
4. The authorities did not appoint officials to be responsible for cooperation with event organizers
and participants. They did not provide citizens with information about designated contact persons.
5. The authorities did not assist the organizers with technical arrangements for the event and in
certain cases created obstacles for its organization.
6.  The authorities  did not  prove  the  need for  “preventive interference”  nor  did they prove the
existence of apparent and inevitable threats of violence that could be used as a basis for police
officials to stop, inspect, and/or detain demonstrators who were on their way to the rally (use of
metal detectors, etc.).
7. The authorities did not prove that a complete cordon was necessary for sustaining public order
and  safety.  The  cordon  prevented  participants  from  leaving  the  allocated  territory,  was  not  a
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proportionate measure given the peaceful nature of the assembly, and could have led to violations of
individual rights to liberty and freedom of movement.
8. Police tactics did not comply with international standards on containment, which should only be
used in exceptional cases. Containing demonstrators in a limited space (also known as “kettling”)
and other similar measures are problematic because they do not distinguish between those who
participate in the event and those who do not or between peaceful and non-peaceful participants.
Building  a  complete  cordon  that  prevents  people  from leaving a  certain  area  is  a  violation  of
individual rights to liberty and freedom of movement.
9. As participants made their way to the rally, the police demonstrated a lack of mediation and “soft
power” skills, which are vital for reducing violence and minimizing conflict. Instead of mediation
and negotiation,  police  pressured participants  and threatened to  terminate  the  event  and detain
demonstrators. Later on, the event was forcibly dispersed.  
10.  The police did not use evasive tactics to solve the situation.  For example,  they could have
moved the police chain around the participants in order to lower the pressure on the crowd and let
demonstrators reach the event location.
11. International standards maintain that the police must allow time for participants to react to their
orders. These orders should be given to all demonstrators in a peaceful manner. 
12. Given the situation, police tactics of breaking up the crowd by pushing peaceful demonstrators
away  from  the  event  location  and  herding  people  towards  the  waterfront  parapet  were  not
proportional. These actions do not comply with international standards concerning the use of force
by police officials. 
13.  According  to  international  standards,  if  events  become  violent,  participants  lose  the  legal
guarantee  of  protection  and  support.  Such  events  may  be  terminated  with  the  use  of  special
measures.   However,  the  use  of  violence  by  individual  demonstrators  or  by  a  small  group  of
participants,  including  speeches  inciting  violence,  does  not  automatically  qualify  an  event  as
non-peaceful. The event should be dispersed only if there is an apparent threat of violent action and
when police officials have used all reasonable measures to protect participants from possible harm
(including, for example, the suppression of aggressive participants who threaten to use violence).
According to international standards, the event should not be dispersed if only a small group of
demonstrators commit acts of violence. Concrete measures against such a group should be used
instead. Similarly, in the case of agents-provocateurs during a peaceful event, the police should take
measures to suppress them instead of terminating or dispersing the whole event. None of these
international standards were observed, and no specific measures were taken to suppress and detain
any agents-provocateurs.
14. When dispersing the event, the majority of instances when the police used special equipment
were  not  proportional  measures  given the  peaceful  nature  of  the  event.  These actions  violated
international  standards  regarding the  use  of  force  (for  example,  police  used  batons  to  hit  vital
organs) and the necessity of providing help to injured participants.
 
15. As made clear in the video materials analyzed by the Commission, the police provoked most of
the violent actions. In many situations, the use of force was not proportional and escalated tensions
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between the police and demonstrators. This led to an increase in resistance by peaceful participants,
and  an  intensifying  of  pressure  on  the  crowd  by  the  police  who  then  detained  a  number  of
demonstrators. 
16. The police tactics during the termination of the event did not comply with the principle of
proportionality, as there was no apparent threat of the violent actions or existence of mass riots to
justify such harsh measures. Violent actions towards peaceful demonstrators were even used outside
of the rally place, in particular on Lavrushinsky lane, Kadashevskaya waterfront, and Pyatnitskaya
street.
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VIII. Further reaction of the state bodies 
Criminal investigations relating to accusations of rioting and of resistance to police officers in the
area  of  Bolotnaya Square  were launched at  9:00pm on May 6.  According to the Investigation
Committee of the Russian Federation, the cases were launched under Part 3 of Article 212 of the
Criminal Code (calls for rioting) and Part 1 of Article 318 of the Criminal Code (violence against
public officers). Later, the Investigation Committee launched a criminal case on the May 6 events
under  Article 212.1,  212.2,  212.3 (mass disorder),  318.1,  and 318.2 (violence against a public
officer). 
All those detained on May 6, including future defendants in the Bolotnaya case, were accused of
violating articles 19.3 (disobedience of the lawful order of a policeman) and 20.2 (breaking of the
established order for organising public rallies) of the Russian Federation’s Code of Administrative
Offences. 
27 participants in the events are defendants in criminal trials, and 16 have been held in custody. The
authorities  rapidly  dealt  with three people:  Maxim Luzyanin,  sentenced to 4.5 years  in  prison;
Konstantin  Lebedev,  sentenced  to  2.5  years  in  prison,  and  Mikhail  Kosenko,  sentenced  to
compulsory treatment in a psychiatric hospital. 
In addition to these 27 defendants of the so-called “Bolotnaya case” (five of whom were pardoned
in December), there is publicly available information on dozens of cases in more than 10 Russian
regions  where  the  police  have  started  investigations  against  participants  and  supporters  of  the
Bolotnaya march. Moreover, the authorities launched investigative actions against involved civil
society  groups  (Golos,  For  Human  Rights,  the  Builders’ Union,  and  the  Defending  the  Hope
movement),  political  movements  (Left  Front,  The  Other  Russia,  Solidarity,  PARNAS,  Russian
Social  Democrats,  Reformation,  and  Peoples’ Alliance).  These  investigative  measures  included
interrogations,  searches  of  private  residences  and  office  premises,  seizure  of  information  and
materials (including personal computers), and the bringing charges against activists or members of
their families. The authorities also used administrative pressure to prevent civil society activism and
participation in public events of any kind.  The majority of these actions were undertaken despite
being in violation of existing regulations of the Russian Federation’s Criminal Proceedings Code.  
A detailed description of these actions will be present in the next version of this Report.
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IX. Conclusion
9.1. General conclusions
The chronological overview of the May 6 events on Bolotnaya square and its vicinity presented
here demonstrates that violence and violations of public order were mainly caused by the actions of
the authorities, mainly the police, both before and during the events. Organizers had notified the
authorities  about  their  plans  to  hold  the  event  in  accordance  with  all  the  procedures  of  the
Assemblies Act and met with the authorities to negotiate proposed changes to those plans. But the
police decided to impose their own restrictions and limit the space for the rally to a small territory
around the Bolotnaya waterfront instead of allowing demonstrators to occupy the whole territory of
Bolotnaya Square.
On the day of the event, large numbers of police officers were mobilised, both in the streets near
Bolotnaya Square and along the demonstrators' routes to the square. It is very important that the
positioning of the police cordon at the end of Maly Kamenny Bridge resulted in a bottleneck and
serious traffic-jam, limiting demonstrators' access to the Bolotnaya waterfront. This jam became the
main trigger of the tension, when many people were gathered on the bridge and unable to move
either forward or back.
The  traffic  jam  also  became  the  site  of  the  primary  physical  clash  between  police  and  the
demonstrators. Police decided not to build any physical barriers to the demonstrators' movements
and thus  as  soon as  movement  was  no  longer  possible  it  increased  the  pressure  on  the  police
cordons. Finally the police had to let people in and some of demonstrators wound up behind the
police lines. Instead of interpreting this “breakthrough” as the result of massive pressure on the
large crowd, the police treated it as an act of aggression and reacted aggressively in their turn. Some
of the demonstrators who had broken through the police cordon were detained and others became
the targets of police violence.
When the police had rebuilt their lines they performed a series of aggressive forward movements to
split up the crowd and detain the demonstrators. This, in its turn, provoked two main reactions:
some people resisted passively, joining hands to prevent the police from detaining the, while others
(who were fewer) responded aggressively and used violence against the police. Some threw various
types of projectiles, while others beat police officers. These clashes set the tone for the rest of the
afternoon and the evening, when the police used various types of force to split up and disperse the
crowd.
During the day there were several attempts by the organizers to negotiate and establish dialogue
with the police and political figures, but they did not succeed. Organizers terminated the event in
response to police demand, though if the event had been allowed to continue it might have lowered
tension and the whole situation could have developed in a totally different manner.
During the next few hours, between 6:00pm and 9:30pm, there were sporadic clashes between the
police and demonstrators. Many people were detained and later accused, notwithstanding the fact
that evidence collected from the media and other sources proved that many of those detained did not
participate actively in the violence. Many people were mainly detained for being in the wrong place
at the wrong time while many of those using violence towards the police were able to hide in the
51
«May 6, 2012 events on Bolotnaya square.  Assessment by the International Expert Commission»
crowd while police officials often detained other people at random.
There  are  multiple  video  records  that  prove  the  police  abused  people  who were  not  resisting,
including women, elderly people and demonstrators who were trying to leave.  There is  still  no
indication that any police officials have been prosecuted for their actions during the events.
It is obvious that there are serious questions regarding the detentions, arrests and accusations levied
against  people  in  connection  with  the  events  of  May  6  on  Bolotnaya.  There  are  also  serious
questions regarding the authorities’ intentions, the transparency and responsibility of official bodies,
the police’s tactics and their real aims. The Commission had issued a series of letters to different
official bodies regarding different aspects of the administration and policing of the March. We were
hoping that the authorities’ responses to these questions would allow us to clear up certain issues.
So far, however, the authorities have not answered the following questions. 
9.2. Major questions to the police and other authorities
• Why did the police change their initial plan of action, which had been agreed upon by the city
administration and the event organizers?  Why did they not allow demonstrators to enter the
larger part of Bolotnaya Square?
• Why did the police constantly refuse to participate in a dialogue with the organizers and other
actors in order to lower tensions?
• Why didn’t the police take any preventive measures to diminish the traffic-jam near the Udarnik
cinema and allow people to access the meeting place?
• Why weren’t  some  of  the  demonstrators  allowed  to  leave  when  the  tension  increased  and
violence became widespread?
• Why didn’t the police try to lower the tensions on the Bolotnaya waterfront instead of engaging
in large-scale detentions and attacks on the crowd?
• Why weren’t the police equipped with shields to protect themselves, strengthen their lines and
direct the flow of demonstrators if needed?
• Did the police determine the number of demonstrators who were injured during the events of
May 6?
• How many police officers were accused of abuse of power during the events? Were sanctions
levied against any of them?
9.3.  Did  the  events  of  May 6  Meet  the  Threshold  of  “Mass  riots”  or Other
Elements of Article 212?
The following factors, as described earlier in this report, indicate that the events of May 6 should
not, as a whole, have been classified as meeting the definitional threshold of “mass riots”: 
• The  police  cordon  at  the  end  of  the  Maly  Kammeny Bridge served  to  create  a  significant
bottleneck near the Udarnik cinema, which – in combination with the failure of the police to
seek, through dialogue, ways of accomodating the large numbers of participants – resulted in
people  being  tightly  confined  in  an  inadequate  space,  unable  to  move  either  forwards  or
backwards, thereby heightening tensions.
• These problems were exacerbated by the use of metal detectors, the fact that some individuals
appear to have been prevented from leaving the area by the police, and confusion about when
precisely, and under what authority, the assembly was terminated.
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• These factors contributed to a number of individuals ending up behind police lines when the
police cordon was breached at approximately 5:55pm. As has been noted,  it is not possible to
determine whether the breakthrough was deliberate or if the police cordon broke simply due to
the pressure of numbers. However, those who found themselves behind the police cordon did
not act in an aggressive manner.
• Video material  provides little evidence that the demonstrators initiated violence between 6pm
and  8pm.   In  general,  the  demonstrators  appear  to  have  pushed  back  against  police  lines
primarily in response to police advances.
• Apart from a single Molotov cocktail, the projectiles that were thrown from the crowd seem to
have been limited to items that were brought for routine purposes – such as plastic bottles, shoes
and umbrellas – rather than items that had might have been brought with the intention that they
would be used as weapons. While throwing such projectiles at the police can undoubtedly cause
injury, where only a small number of individuals are involved in such activities (as the video
evidence suggests) it is difficult to see how this could meet the threshold of “mass riots.”
• The single episode when pieces of asphalt were thrown at the police is not sufficient for the
whole event to be considered to have met the threshold of “mass riots.”
• Shouting abuse at the police, or even later overturning portable toilet cabins (at approximately
8pm),  should  not  be  regarded as  violent  conduct  at  the  upper  end of  the  scale,  capable  of
meeting the threshold of “mass disorder.” 
From the evidence reviewed, it is also unclear whether any of the incidents observed would meet
the threshold required to fall within the accompanying elements of Article 212(1). The policing
operation seems to have randomly identified some individuals for arrest.  However, as has been
emphasized, it is imperative that compelling and demonstrable evidence be presented to show that
the particular individuals detained were themselves involved in acts of violence, pogroms, arson,
the destruction of property, the use of firearms, explosives or explosive devices, or armed resistance
to a public official.  In particular:
• The throwing of a single Molotov cocktail at approximately 6pm – while undoubtedly a serious
incident – should not be regarded as sufficient to substantiate the finding of arson, less still the
occurrence of  “mass  riots.”  In  this  regard,  further  investigations  are  imperative  in  order  to
identify those culpable of encouraging such aggression against the police. 
• As noted above, the nature of the other projectiles thrown at the police lines were not such that
they could be described as “armed resistance” against public officials.
• While the overturning of the toilet cabins might be regarded as  damaging property, only in a
small number of cases (and only where there is compelling evidence of the involvement of
particular  individuals)  could  it  be  regarded  as  property  destruction capable  of  supporting  a
charge of participation in “mass riots.”
The  prosecutions  arising  from  the  events  of  May  6  provide  an  opportunity  for  the  courts  to
authoritatively interpret the offences alleged under Article 212 of the Criminal Code. Any such
interpretation must comply with the principle of legal certainty, and afford adequate protection of
the rights to liberty, freedom of movement, and peaceful assembly (amongst others).
On the basis of the evidence reviewed, the events of May 6 should not, as a whole, be classified
as meeting the definitional threshold of “mass riots.”
Any  prosecutions  must  be  rigorously  supported  by  compelling  and  demonstrable  evidence  of
particular individuals’ involvement in the specific offences charged (not on the basis of their mere
presence at the scene of the demonstration).
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1. Appeal  by  journalists  and  public  observers  to  Russian  and  international  human  rights
organizations about the assessment of events of 6th May 2012 on Bolotnaya square in Moscow. 
2. Memorandum on establishment of International Expert Commission for Evaluation of Events on 
Bolotnaya Square, Moscow on May 6, 2012.
3. Composition of the International Experts Commission
4. Declaration of support to the Commission by major Russian human rights NGOs.
5. Questions addressed by the Commission to authorities and other stakeholders regarding the 6may
2012 events.
6. Changes introduced to the Assemblies Act after Bolotnaya Square events
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Appendix 1.
Appeal of the journalists and public observers to Russian and international human rights
organizations about the evaluation of events on May 6, 2012 on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow
We are the journalists and public observers who have witnessed events on Bolotnaya Square in
Moscow on May 6, 2012. Now we are observing the series of arrests and detentions of people who
took part in these events. They are facing different charges: participation in the riots, incitement for
riots, violence to the authorities' representatives, and the last three detainees are charged with the
organizing mass riots. The harsh preventive punishment was selected — the taking these people into
custody. Currently, defendants in the case are 21 people. About thousand of people were questioned
as witnesses.
Our own observations, many media messages and reports of human rights organizations indicate
that the possible causes of violence on Bolotnaya Square were actions of both protesters and police.
Today, however, the investigating authorities accuse only the rally participants. As far as we know,
no policeman are suspected of excess of power, illegal use of violence and violation of the law -
even though we personally witnessed such scenes, and they have been repeatedly documented.
Immediately after the events on Bolotnaya Square, the Ministry of Interior reported that as a result
of the protesters' actions 26 police officers were injured, some of them were hospitalized - though
no confirmation of this  information has been provided.  The authorities are not reported on the
citizens affected by the actions of the police.
In the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation the hearing devoted to the practice of Art. 212 of
the Criminal Code (article on the riots) was held. All persons involved in the case of the events that
occurred on May 6, are charged under two articles - Article 318 of the Criminal Code (use of
violence against a representative of authorities), as well as Article 212 of the Criminal Code, that's
why there was a question of the adequacy of this article in the case. All lawyers and human rights
activists who participated in the hearing agree that at the current moment the Article 212 of the
Criminal Code does not have legal certainty and can be used to restrict the rights and freedoms of
citizens. Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin has officially reported that as a result of his analysis of the
events of May 6 that the riots didn't take place.
We have serious doubts about the objectivity and comprehensiveness of the investigation, interest of
the  government agencies to recover the actual course of events and to bring to justice those who are
guilty. This fact is evidenced by statements of the officials made before the end of the investigation
and  court  decisions.  In  particular,  the  Press-secretary  of  the  President  Putin  D.Peskov  called
protesters as "provocateurs" and police reaction as too "soft», and the Chairman of the Investigative
Committee A.Bastrykin compared the protesters with "militants".
In August, September, and October hearings took place, in result of which 15 out of 21 defendants
in the case were kept under arrest.  According to lawyers,  there are numerous violations in  the
process: the rights of the detainee aren't respected, the staff of the investigative committee interfere
with the lawyer's work, and the court doesn't take into account the results of expert examinations.
The basis for the last 3 detentions were the material of the film "Anatomy of Protest-2" released by
the Russian federal TV channel NTV. The authenticity of the facts  presented in the film raises
serious  doubts  not  only among experts,  but  among any attentive viewers.  In  the  previous  film
"Anatomy of Protest" it was claimed that all the protesters in Russia receive money from foreign
countries. The main message of the film "Anatomy of Protest-2" is the fact that the opposition is
preparing new riots using the money of a foreign state. The main document is the video recording
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dated June, the authenticity of which has not been proved. This video recording was the basis for
arraignment for three activists in preparation for organizing riots.
According to the report, the last detainee Leonid Razvozhaev was kidnapped in Ukraine after he
had applied for status as a political refugee.  Then he was forced to Russia. In his words, after
several days of torture he signed all the required confession. Including that at the meeting shown in
the  film  "Anatomy  of  Protest-2",  he  and  his  companions  discussed  with  Georgian  politician
financing of the riots that occurred on May 6.
At least the fact that it is not possible from the point of view of the Russian calendar, in which May
precedes June, tells that the criminal case against the last three defendants comprises a plurality of
fraud.
All these facts strongly suggest that the results of investigations and sentences to people involved in
the case will be dictated not by the law, but by political will, and for this political will Russian
authorities are ready to violate all international rules of law.
We think that in these conditions, the formation of the International Expert Commission of experts
on freedom of assembly and police response measures could contribute to objective and impartial
evaluation of the events. The Committee on the base of official data and material of public and state
investigation  would  give  a  legal  assessment  of  the  actions  of  protesters  and  police,  impartial
assessment of the legitimacy and proportionality of the use of force at the meeting on 6 May and the
subsequent administrative and criminal prosecution of its members. Such an assessment, based on
international standards, could be an alternative to current state investigation. 
We ask you to use the expert experience of your organization and contacts for the formation of such
a commission of experts in the nearest future.
We also ask you to refer to the international intergovernmental organizations (Council of Europe,
OSCE, UN, etc.) in order to draw their attention to the situation around this case, to make it the
subject of the relevant structures, to send observers to the trials and support the work of the expert
committee. 
Signatures of journalists and public observers (altogether 9 signatures)
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Appendix  2.
Memorandum on establishment of International Expert Commission for Evaluation of Events
on Bolotnaya Square, Moscow on May 6, 2012
1. In response to appeals by Russian journalists and human rights defenders a number of leading
international human rights organizations  announce the creation of the  International Expert
Commission for Evaluation of Events on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow on May 6, 2012 (“the
Commission”).
2. The main aim  of the Commission is to  analyses  the events of May 6 2012 in Moscow and
evaluate the responses by the relevant authorities in terms of their compatibility with international
standards on freedom of assembly and international standards of policing.
3. The objectives of the Commission:
▪ To outline the chronology of the events of May 6 2012,
▪ To assess the compatibility of the relevant legal framework (including the concept of
mass riots) with international human rights standards,
▪ To review the measures taken by the police and the authorities in preparation, during
and after the assembly, and consider whether they were  justified, necessary and
proportional,
▪ To review any legal cases resulting from the events of May 6 (focusing in particular
on the so-called ”Bolotnaya case”). 
4. The Commission will base its work on the following materials:
• evidence from  the official investigation, any  reports  and  statements  made  by
relevant authorities, and any  other official information available on the case,
• information from public investigations and observations, gathered by human rights
defenders, journalists and others,
• reports by observers and journalists, witness testimonies and video materials.
5. The founding organizations of the Commission are the following: 
Amnesty International
Article19
European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and Human Rights
International Civil Initiative for OSCE (ICI OSCE)
International Platform «Civil Solidarity»
International Protection Center
Human Rights Watch
Each founding organization  will   nominate a  representative as a  contact person to oversee the
mandate, which the Commission follows, and facilitate  communication between the Commission
and international intergovernmental organizations (the United Nations, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Council of Europe etc.), and  other relevant institutions.
6. The Commission consists of leading experts on issues of peaceful assemblies and policing
measures: 
Adam Bodnar (Poland),
Michael Hamilton (United Kingdom),
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Neil Jarman (United Kingdom), 
Oleg Martynenko (Ukraine),
Sergei Ostaf (Moldova),
Yevgeniy Zhovtis (Kazakhstan).
7. The Commission may involve in its work other experts on either a  permanent or a temporary
basis. The decision to include other experts in the Commission will   be taken by the  current
members with the agreement of the representatives  of the founding organizations.
8. The Commission will  base its work on universal norms and standards regulating assemblies as
well as measures to protect public order during  assembles, provided by the following international
documents: European Convention on Human Rights, including its interpretation in the decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
including its interpretation in the opinions of the Human Rights Committee; OSCE ODIHR and
Venice Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assemblies.
9. The founding organizations of the Commission have  established the Secretariat, to provide
constant technical assistance to  the work of the Commission. The address of the Secretariat is
secretariat@6mayсommission.org. 
10. Being a founding organization of the Commission is not an endorsement of the Commission’s
findings. Each founding organization reserves the right to its own  views and opinions about the
Commission’s findings and will  make use of the Commission’s findings only in ways that are
appropriate for the founding organization. 
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Appendix 3.
Declaration to support the International Expert Commission of evaluation of May 6 2012 events
We,  undersigned  Russian  human  rights  organizations  welcome  the  establishment  of  the  International  Expert
Commission for evaluation of events that took place on Bolotnaya square in Moscow on May 6 2012 (hereafter
named as Commission) and we are ready to provide any necessary help and assistance to its work.
We recognize high public importance of these events as well as the need to attract the public attention to the
administrative and criminal cases that were open after.
We welcome the attempts of different groups within Russia who are collecting the evidences and perform their
own investigation of what has happened and we think that the international evaluation and research based on
recognized international norms and standards of human rights and policing measures will be an important addition
to this national work.
We think that the Commission's work will become a crucial element for evaluation of the Russian legislation and
law-enforcement practice to compliance to the international standards of freedom of peaceful assemblies and
policing measrues.
We are ready to support the Commision with the following:
• search and presentation of the documents, video-records, analytics and any other materials that will be
needed for experts' work,
• consulting  on  issues  of  law-enforcement  practice  of  the  national  legislation  on  freedom of  peaceful
assemblies,  maintaining  of  the  public  order  and  use  of  force,  rights  of  detainees,  guarantees  of
administrative and criminal proceedings etc.,
• communication between the Commission and Russian authorities, NGOs and other relevant stakeholders,
• informational support in spreading the materials, reports, statements, appeals etc.
• other possible support on Russian and international level.
Signing this declaration does not mean the full agreement with the Commission's results of work. Undersigned
NGOs keep the right to their own position about the conclusions by the Commission and will use them for their
own purposes.
• Citizens' Watch (Saint-Petersburg);
• Civic Assistance Committee (Moscow);
• Human Rights Institute (Moscow);
• Interregional Committee Against Torture (Nizhny Novgorod);
• Komi Human Rights Commission “Memorial” (Syktyvkar);
• Moscow Helsinki Group;
• Youth Human Rights Movement;
• Public Verdict Foundation (Moscow);
• Centre for Democracy Development and Human Rights (Moscow);
• Lawyers for Constitutional Freedoms and Rights (Moscow);
• Human Rights Centre “Memorial” (Moscow)
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Appendix 4. 
Composition of the International Expert Commission for evaluation of events on Bolotnaya
square on May 6, 2012, Moscow
Adam BODNAR
Adam BODNAR (Poland) is an associate professor (adiunkt) in the Human Rights Chair, Faculty of
Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw, a senior expert within FRANET network at
EU Fundamental Rights Agency, vice-president of the Board at Helsinki Foundation for Human
Rights, Warsaw, Poland. He is also the Director of Observatory for Freedom of Media in Poland.
Adam Bodnar is an author of several scholar publications and commentaries published in the Polish
press. He is mostly interested in protection of fundamental rights, jurisprudence of the European
Court  of  Human  Rights  and European Court  of  Justice,  EU citizenship,  and role  of  NGOs in
pursuing public interest and freedom of speech.
Michael HAMILTON
Michael  HAMILTON  (United  Kingdom)  –  PHD,  associate  professor  of  law,  secretary  to  the
OSCE/ODIHR Panel of Experts on Freedom of Assembly, a lecturer in human rights law at the
Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster. His research has focused on the legal regulation
and mediation of public protest, particularly parade disputes in Northern Ireland
Neil JARMAN
Neil JARMAN (United Kingdom) – chairperson оf the OSCE ODIHR Panel of Experts on Freedom
of Assembly,head to the group of authors of OSCE ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines on
freedom of peaceful assembly, Director of the Institute for Conflict Research in Belfast, Northern
Ireland, UK. His academic interest is primarily in peace building activity and conflict mitigation,
with specific  focus on public  assemblies and their  policing,  and community-based responses to
violence  and  public  disorder.  He  was  a  Specialist  Adviser  with  the  Northern  Ireland  Affairs
Committee  for  the  inquiry  into  hate  crimes  in  Northern  Ireland.
He is the author of numerous publications on issues such as policing public order, human rights and
conflict resolution, and combating hate crime.
Yevgeniy A. ZHOVTIS
Yevgeniy A. ZHOVTIS (Kazakhstan) - Defense Lawyer, Member of the Working Group on Human
Dimension Under  the Ministry of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Republic  of  Kazakhstan.  His  primary
interest is in civil liberties sphere. Yevgeniy is a member of OSCE/ODIHR Panel of Experts of
Freedom of Assembly.
Oleg MARTYNENKO
Oleg MARTYNENKO (Ukraine)– Doctor Degree in Law, expert in the field of crime prevention
among police  officers,  of  the  provision  of  human rights  in  law-enforcement  bodies  and of  the
determination  of  hate  crimes.  National  trainer  of  UNDP on  the  domestic  violence  prevention.
Secretary  of  the  Advisory  Council  to  the  Ombudsman,  member  of  the  Public  Council  to  the
Ministry of Interior of Ukraine. For a long time worked in the penitentiary system and internal
affairs  bodies  of  Ukraine.  Oleg  had  participated  in  the  peacekeeping  missions  in  Kosovo  and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the period of 2008-2010, he was the head of the Ministry of Interior of
Ukraine Department of monitoring of human rights observance. Took part in international projects
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on  the  implementation  of  national  prevention  mechanisms  against  torture,  establishment  of
mechanisms for public expertise and civilian inquiries of human rights violations, prevention of
ethnic profiling in the Ukrainian police activity.
Serghei OSTAF
Serghei  OSTAF  (Moldova)  is  the  member  of  Panel  of  Experts  on  Freedom  of  Assembly  at
OSCE/ODIHR,  the  Director  of  the  Resource  Center  for  Human Rights  (CReDO),  a  non-profit
organization that develops the capacity of civil society organizations to advocate for democratic
changes and that is engaged in the promotion of democratic policies in Moldova.
Ostaf has been involved in human rights advocacy work in Moldova and advocacy with the Council
of Europe, UN human rights bodies, and the ODIHR. His current interests include lobbying for the
adoption of democratic public policies by the government, consulting on effective implementation
of such policies through the use of legal and institutional mechanisms. He teaches master-level
courses in public policy, policy-process analysis, and democratic policy implementation.
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Appendix 5
Questions addressed by the Commission to authorities and other stakeholders regarding the
6may 2012 events.
Questions to the organizers
1. What was the immediate response by the authorities to the application for the assembly?
2.  What  concerns  (eg  public  order,  traffic)  were  raised  by  the  authorities  in  the  course  of  the
negotiations?
3. Were there any alternatives that were indicated as being acceptable by applicants?
4.  Was there any opportunity to  challenge the time-frames or other arrangements  suggested by the
authorities?
5. Was there a written agreement as to the route, placement, security measures and other organizational
details of the assembly, coming out of the negotiation with the authorities?
6. What preparatory work was carried out with the organizers of a peaceful assembly on the part of the
municipal bodies? Were there any changes in a timely manner specified in the location of police forces
and security measures (metal detectors, traffic blocs, additional video surveillance)?
7. Have the organizers of a peaceful meeting developed a general strategy of action, safety measures in
case of provocation or accident cases, the procedure for notifying the local authorities in case of change
the situation, the instructions to participants of a peaceful assembly?
8.  What  the problems had the organizers  and why during a peaceful  meeting in  the control  of the
number of participants, their behavior and replacements?
9. Had been a clear procedure for interaction between the peaceful action organizers and police and
emergency services (a list of responsible persons, communication channels, time and respond manner) ?
10. What were the peaceful action organizers needs to ensure the safety of citizens and which resources
have been proposed to the organizers by the municipal authorities?
11. Are you aware of any participants (from Moscow and the regions) who were prevented to come and
take part in the rally?
Questions to the municipal authority
1. Was there a written agreement as to the route, placement, security measures and other organizational
details of the assembly, coming out of the negotiation with the organizers?
2. What were the reasons for proposing alternatives to the initially requested route of the assembly?
3. What preparatory work was carried out with the organizers of a peaceful assembly on the part of the
municipal bodies? Were there any changes in a timely manner specified in the location of police forces
and security measures (metal detectors, traffic blocs, additional video surveillance)?
4. What additional security measures have been taken by municipal authorities in the form of the free
access to the place of peaceful assembly of ambulance and medical services; introduction of additional
public transport schedule for the transportation of protesters from the site of the demonstration; mobile
point  of  sale  of  basic  necessities  and  medicines;  mobile  light-boxes  to  provide  the  emergency
information and instructions of possible routes?
5. Were there any additional briefings with medical establishments’ staff, emergency services before of
the peaceful protest, and what was the content of the instructions
6. What other city authorities were involved (eg requisitioning of water tankers)?
7. When was the decision to close off Bolotnaya square taken? on what grounds? Who has taken that
decision?
8. Were the organizers notified of those changes? And if not then why?
9. Were the representatives of municipal authorities as provided by the law present during the assembly?
How many? What were their specific tasks and what were they doing during the assembly?
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Questions to the police authorities
1. Has there been a preliminary reconnaissance capabilities of the police on the eve of the mass action?
Whether during the reconnaissance had been provided the mobility maneuver of police cordons in order
to avoid unnecessary crowding protesters, threatening their health and the normal process of the action?
(Base - requirements pp. 27, 28.7, 42, 111, 113 Part III. «Control of forces and means of Patrol police"
Patrol Police Code)?
2. If such actions had been provided, why they were not implemented in a timely manner and has there
been an internal investigation of the manner? If these maneuvers were not provided, how the police
helped to avoid unnecessary crowding protesters, their disorientation in this situation?
3.  Were  the  citizens  provided  with  most  comfortable  movement  routes  in  the  current  situation  in
accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 16 of the Law "On Police"? If so, how it had been conducted and
how many citizens got the information?
4. Was there any intelligence about tents about to be set up in the place of assembly?
5. What searches have been carried out at the entrance points to the assemble? What was confiscated
during the searches?
6. What are the legal grounds for security measures taken (metal detectors)? For what type of assemblies
are they usually used? Was the security plan involving those measures agreed upon beforehand with the
organizers?
7. Based on what arguments and by whose decision it  was decided to give priority to the physical
contact of the police, as opposed to the active use of non-lethal means of influence - water cannons and
tear gas - to avoid a direct clash with the protesters by the police? What other less intrusive options were
considered as possible?
8. How many relatives or close persons of victims, inflicting bodily injuries as a result of the use of
physical force or special means, were notified by police in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 19 of
the Law "On Police"?
9. Was the analysis carried out by the police after the mass action? What was the overall assessment of
the actions,  made by police? What conclusions have been made concerning the police officers who
committed unprofessional actions in the protection of public order and arrest of the protesters? (Base -
p. 28.6, 28.8, 130, 139.3 hours III. «Control of forces and means of Patrol police" Patrol Police Code).
10. Why did the riot police not have shields, and do they usually use them during mass protest of similar
kind?
11. What was the legal authority/basis for order regarding intensiveness of metal detector searches?
12. What different police units were deployed (including plain-clothed officers)
13. What was the total size of the police deployment?
14. What instructions/orders were given to the police both in advance, and as the events unfolded, both
in relation to the facilitation of peaceful assembly, and with regards to arrests and the use of force?
15. What other less intrusive options (if any) were considered by the police before intervening, and what
evidence exists for these options having been considered?
16. What individual responses have followed from the complaints against the police action?
17. Have the authorities initiated any investigations into the use of force by the police? If so, when will
the conclusions of such investigations be known
18. What (video) evidence has been retained? What video surveillance did the police obtained on a day
and what was done with it?
19. What specific injuries did the police suffer, and is there medical evidence of this?
20. How many police officers were injured and what is the nature of their injuries?
21. Were there plain-clothed police in the crowd?
22.  Video-materials  showed  that  a  number  of  protesters  received  injuries.  Have  there  been  any
investigations on police use of force and any police officer been disciplined?
23. How many protesters were detained on a day? And what were the main charges for those detained?
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(we need the exact number of detainees, charges that they got and  sentences that people got)?
24. Why did they close the stage and cut off the electricity supply? Who had taken the decision to stop
the meeting? (liaison officer vs the big boss)
25.  When  exactly  did  the  demonstration  stop?  When  (at  what  exact  point)  did  you  regard  the
demonstration as unlawful?
26. Was there anything different in the police conduct during this specific assembly in comparison to
previous similar assemblies?
Questions to public observers
1. Have the authorities requested the testimony of observers, present at the Bolotnaya Square on May 6?
If so, to what extent and how they were used?
2. Have public observers initiated an examination of their observations by state authorities and what was
the result of such examination?
3. How many public observers were there? Which organizations did they represent?
4. Are there any reports on what was witnessed on may 6? Whom had they been given to? If not, why
didn't they produce the report? If yes, is it a public document?
5. Were there any obstacles from police and from the authorities on the spot to the work of public
observers?
Questions for Ombudsman’s office?
1. How many representatives of the Ombudsman were present at the assembly?
2. Have the authorities requested the testimony of the Ombudsman and his representatives, present at 
the Bolotnaya Square on May 6? If so, to what extent and how they were used?
3. Have the Ombudsman initiated an examination of his observations by state authorities and what was 
the result of such examination?
4. Are there any reports on what was witnessed on may 6? Whom had they been given to? If not, why 
didn't they produce the report? If yes, is it a public document?
5. Were there any obstacles from police and from the authorities on the spot to the work of Ombdusman 
and his representatives?
Questions for the Investigation Committee
1.  What  are  the  guarantees  for  an  objective  and  impartial  selection  of  the  task-force  for  the  case
(Investigative group)? Is there any evidence of such selection in the open (public) sources?
2.  How to  ensure  the  availability  of  civilian  control  over  the  overall  progress  of  the  work  of  the
Investigation Committee?
3. Whether the materials on recovering of compensation for the protesters are considering during the
investigation, regardless of protesters’ status (witness, suspect or accused)?
4. Were representatives of investigative committee present on the square at the day?
5. What are the grounds for qualifying the events as mass riots?
6. Was there any investigation into the complaints launched against the police? If no, why?
7. What was the legal authority/basis for searches of homes/offices of witnesses?
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Appendix 6.
Changes introduced to the Assemblies Act after Bolotnaya Square events
Following the Bolotnaya Square events the government decided to introduce significant changes to
the Assemblies Act and to further restrict the freedom of assembly. 
The Assemblies Act has been amended by the Federal Law No. 65-FZ of 8 June 2012. Please note
that already at  that time the Assemblies Act was subject  of huge criticism by the international
community  as  non-complying with international  standards  (see analysis  above).  However,  June
2012 amendments made situation even worse and failed to address any previous recommendations
by such bodies as the Venice Commission. Those amendments were subject of examination by the
Russian Constitutional Court, which gave judgment on 14 February 2013, but which did not result
in fact in major improvements of standards. 
Below are the  most important changes brought by the June 2012 amendments to the Assemblies
Act:
1.  Prohibition of organization of assemblies by persons who were previously convicted of certain
crimes (Art.  5.2.1.1  of  the  Assemblies  Act).  The  list  of  crimes  is  extensive  and  includes  also
previous  violations  of  the  Assemblies  Act.  Therefore,  the  whole  category  of  people  is  in  fact
excluded from a possibility to organize meetings, demonstrations etc. The time of exclusion lasts
pending the execution of a sentence against a given individual. The Russian Constitutional Court
found  this  provision  as  being  in  compliance  with  the  Constitution.  However,  it  was  severely
criticized by the Venice Commission (opinion of 11 March 2013).
2. The June 2012 Amendments introduce  responsbility of the organizer in a situation where the
number  of  participants  exceeds  the  previous  projections  of  the  organizer  and  where  it  may
constitute a threat to public order. Specifically, according to para. 4.71 of Article 5 of the Assembly
Act the organizer has “to take measures to prevent the number of participants announced in the
notice from being exceeded, where exceeding that number creates a threat to public order and/or
public safety, the safety of participants or other persons or risks to damage the property”.45 It is
contrary to principle of proportionality and very essence of the freedom of assembly to create such
restrictions on organizers of public assemblies. 
3. The law introduced prohibition to wear masks during demonstrations. Such prohibitions exist in
some jurisdictions, in some others they are subject of questioning (e.g. Poland46). Wearing masks
should be in general allowed, when it serves freedom of expression purposes.47 However, June 2012
Amendments introduced a blanket ban on any use of masks. In this regard such regulation cannot
stand proportionality test and is contrary to human rights standards. 
45  Translation according to the Venice Commission opinion of 11 March 2013.
46  See judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court of 10 July 2004 (Kp 1/04).
47  According to para. 98 of the OSCE / ODIHR Guidelines on the Freedom of Assembly „wearing of a mask for 
expressive purposes at a peaceful assembly should not be prohibited, so long as the mask or costume is not worn for
the purpose of preventing the identification of a person whose conduct creates probable cause for arrest and so long 
as the mask does not create a clear and present danger of imminent unlawful conduct.”
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4. The June 2012 Amendments  extended a ban on organization of assemblies during the night.
Currently it is between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. Previously, the night “started” at 11 p.m. The previous
regulation was criticized for this. The new one worsens the standard. 
5. There is also a  prohibition to make campaigning or promotion of the event organized before
getting agreement with the respondent authority as regards place and time of the demonstration or
meeting.  This  provision  makes  it  much  more  difficult  for  organizers  to  organize  an  assembly.
Second, it increases powers of administrative authorities. Already now the system of notifications
resembles a concession system of permits for organization of assemblies. The Constitutional Court
interpreted this provision as giving power to organizers to inform the public about the event prior to
the agreement with authorities. However, according to the Venice Commission it does not meet
standards,  as  it  is  difficult  to  distinguish  between  “information”  and  “promotion”  or
“campaigning”.48 
6. The June 2012 Amendments also introduce a principle that assemblies should be in principle
organized in “specially designated places”, which should be indicated by authorities. Under human
rights’ standards, there exists a practice of indicating such places by authorities, but only as a mean
to facilitate freedom of assemblies. For example, the local authorities may indicate specific “hyde
parks”,  where  assemblies  may  be  organized  without  almost  any  constraints  (or  notifications)
whatsoever. However, the purpose of the June 2012 Amendments is completely different. According
to Article 12 Section 3 of the Assemblies Act, the demonstration may be refused, when a chosen
venue is prohibited under the law. At the same time, authorities have broad powers to determine
which venues are prohibited. Such restrictions on the freedom of organizer to choose the location of
an event are contrary to standards. “Specially designated places” become a rule for auhorities and
not the exception. 
7. June 2012 Amendments have also increased the financial penalties concerning non-compliance
with the rules on organization of assemblies. The new penalties are extra-orbitant and fail to meet
human  rights  standards.  The  maximum  penalties  for  citizens  for  violation  of  different  rules
concerning  assemblies  were  increased  from 5.000 RUB to  300.000 RUB,  for  officials  –  from
50.000 RUB to 600.000 RUB. The law originally provided for minimum sanctions. However, this
provision was quashed by the Russian Constitutional Court. Still, the sanctions are extremely high
and may produce chilling effect on freedom of assembly. Furthermore, the June 2012 Amendments
created a new type of sanction, which is community work. It may be ordained up to certain amount
of hours or even days of unpaid work. Finally, the new offence was created, which is “organisation
of a mass simultaneous presence and/or movement of citizens in public places resulting in a breach
of public order”. This provision might be especially applicable with respect to any spontaneous
assemblies or simply protests without prior authorization. It will give a safe excuse for authorities to
intervene and to penalize participants of such events. 
The increase in  financial  sanctions,  new community  work sanction as  well  as  creation of  new
offense were severely criticized by the Venice Commission as being severe and in need of reform.49
48  See para. 34-37 of the opinion of the Venice Commission of 11 March 2013.
49  Opinion of the Venice Commission of 11 March 2013, CDL-AD(2013)03, available at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2013)003-e
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